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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the time, attention, and resources devoted to capital
prosecutions relative to the number of defendants convicted of capital offenses, few executions occur. Accordingly, the number of death
row inmates continues to rise. One issue that has received scholarly
and judicial attention recently concerns the present administration
of capital punishment in the United States: Whether the passage of
time between the imposition of a death sentence and the carrying
out of that sentence can itself ripen into a substantive prohibition
against the execution.' This Article addresses that issue.
Opinion polls generally show that the public largely favors capital punishment, but is ambivalent about the lack of actual executions.2 As presently administered, however, the United States' system
of capital punishment is problematic.' One problem that has reI A similar, but distinctively different claim arising out of the delay between the
pronouncement of a death sentence and an execution is the purported cruelty that
arises out of the repeated setting and staying of execution dates and issuance of last
minute stays of execution. See District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411
N.E.2d 1274, 1290 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos,J., concurring) (detailing Henry P. ArsenSee also Autry v. McKaskle, 465 U.S. 1090, 1091 (1984)
ault's experiences).
(Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of application for stay of execution) (asserting
that the mental anguish an inmate suffers while strapped to a gurney awaiting lethal
injection is cruel and unusual punishment).
2 See David A. Kaplan, Anger and Ambivalence, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 24
(detailing purported public support for capital punishment, but apparent ambivalence regarding executing defendants).
s This Article does not directly challenge the present understanding that the
death penalty does not violate the Constitution. Indeed, one of most intractable
problems of capital punishment has been devising a system that properly defines
capital offenses and establishes a rationale for the prosecution of these crimes and
the imposition of death sentences in a consistent manner. This sentiment was captured in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971), when Justice Harlan
stated: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and
their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteris-
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ceived relatively little forthrightjudicial treatment concerns the delay
between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution of a
capital defendant. The delay between a death sentence and execution is partly attributable to the inequalities in the present administration of the death penalty. 4 As a practical matter, some manner of
delay between the sentence and an execution is both desirable and
inevitable. During this period the defendant may appeal his or her
conviction and sentence, and state officials - such as the prosecutor
and the governor - may decide not to go forward with the execution. It is another issue, however, when the period of delay extends
beyond that which is necessary for the full litigation of the legal
claims in the case.
Today, more than ever, most capital defendants will spend a
considerable amount of time in restrictive confinement on death
row before they are executed, if they ever are executed. This delay is
not always attributable to the litigation of legal issues. While awaiting execution, capital defendants experience mental anguish. This
anguish should be viewed as an ancillary, unauthorized punishment
that makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. It is cruel punishment. Executing a defendant who has
experienced years of that mental anguish would seem to be the infliction of gratuitous pain and suffering, particularly if the capital defendant has experienced a change of character while on death row.
Inordinate delay, as defined in this Article, is a rare occurrence.
Consequently, inmates on death row for a great length of time, who
later face a serious execution date, are unusual. The execution of an
inmate who has had an inordinate stay on death row, however, may
be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Part II outlines the modern law of death eligibility under the
Eighth Amendment. This century, in twelve cases, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether executing a particular class of
defendants is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. In making its
determination, the Court considers whether that class of defendants
tics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." Justice Harlan supported this statement with a brief recollection of the history behind the
United Kingdom's decision to abolish capital punishment and the acknowledgment
by the drafters of the Model Penal Code that their proposed formula of factors to
consider was not exhaustive. See id. at 204-07.
4 Courts have so far rejected arguments that the
present administration of capital punishment and distribution of death sentences violate the Constitution. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987); see also infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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historically has been subjected to capital punishment, the treatment
of the issue in judicial precedents, legislative attitudes about the issue, and the response of capital juries as reflected in their sentencing
decisions. An assessment is made on whether deterrence or retribution will be achieved by the execution. On occasion, the Court has
also considered how that class of defendants is treated under international law or the laws of other nations.
In non-capital cases, under a different variant of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has ruled that the collateral
consequences of an inmate's confinement may violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. These
same strictures should apply in capital cases. The additional mental
strain experienced by capital defendants while on death row for an
inordinate period is a collateral consequence of punishment that
should be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
Part III notes the relative infrequency of executions in light of
the number of capital convictions. It also discusses capital cases in
which the defendant asserted that the state forfeited the right to
execute him, due to the delay between the imposition of the death
sentence and the proposed execution date. These cases indicate
that inordinate delay claims are likely to arise when a serious error
occurs during the prosecution of the case, and while the case is being processed a court rules in the defendant's favor.
Part IV addresses the inordinate delay claim in light of the factors that the Court has outlined since 1976 to define the law of death
eligibility. This Part points out that, as in other death eligibility
cases, an execution after an inordinate delay is unconstitutional if
the punishment makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and is nothing more than the imposition of
pain and suffering. After applying the factors established by the
Court for determining death eligibility, this Part concludes that an
execution after an inordinate stay on death row may violate the
Eighth Amendment.
Although a few recent articles have addressed aspects of an inmate's inordinate stay on death row, this Article, unlike others,

Other commentators have recently considered the issue of delay between the
imposition of a death sentence and the execution of that inmate. One author analyzed United States Supreme Court cases decided before the Eighth Amendment
was applied to capital punishment as well as psychiatric professional literature on
mental stress experienced while awaiting execution. See Richard E. Shugrue, "A Fate
Worse Than Death" - An Essay on Whether Long Times on Death Row are Cruel Times, 29
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grounds its analysis on the Court's cases interpreting the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. This Arti-

cle concludes that, in certain circumstances, an execution after an
inordinate delay between a death sentence and execution may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
II.

EIGHTH AMENDMENTJURISPRUDENCE

It was not until 1962 that the United States Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to the states.6 It took an additional
fourteen years for the Court to address directly the constitutionality
of capital punishment. The Court first considered whether the
Eighth Amendment imposed some restraints on the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia,' which consolidated three cases. The Court, in a
five-four decision, issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion, declaring that the "imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

L. REv. 1 (1995). Although Shugrue did not proffer a definitive answer, he did observe that resolution of the issue will depend on the Court's methodology. Under one approach, which he associates with Justice Scalia, a form of
punishment is valid if it was not prohibited when the Eighth Amendment was enacted or if it is today commonly found in American practice. See id. at 23. In contrast, a more contextual approach, as suggested by justice Breyer's analysis in noncapital cases, involves a systematic examination of the effect of extended incarceration on death row inmates and asks whether that impact is constitutionally cruel,
unusual, or inhumane. See id.at 24. Another article contains suggestions on how to
avoid future delays in executions. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The
Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 1 (1995). A third article relies on
the intent of the Framers of the Eighth Amendment, social science data, international law, and the practices of other nations to conclude that long delays are cruel
and unusual punishment. See Michael P. Connolly, Note, Better Never Than Late:
Prolonged Stays on Death Row Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Crv. CONFINEMENT 101, 137-38 (1997). A fourth commentator reviews the substantive and procedural issues and policy implications of the claim. See Kathleen M.
Flynn, Note, The "Agony of Suspense": How ProtractedDeath Row Confinement Gives Rise
to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 291 (1997). Finally, a fifth article argues that the claim is meritorious and that
it presents a potentially irreconcilable constitutional conflict. Dan Crocker, Extended Stays: Does Lengthy Imprisonment on Death Row Undermine the Goals of Capital
Punishment?, IJ. GENDER, RACE & JusTICE 555 (1998). In contrast to these articles,
this Article addresses the Court's rulings since 1976, which outline the substantive
parameters of the Eighth Amendment.
6 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies to states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit punishing defendants for being addicted to narcotics).
7 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
CREIGHTON
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."" Every judgment was reversed "insofar as it [left] undisturbed the death sentence imposed,"
and the cases were remanded for further proceedings. Each of the
nine Justices wrote separately, and no Justice in the five-person majority joined the opinion of any of the other members of the majority.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who were members of the five
Justice majority, categorically rejected the death penalty as a constitutionally permissible form of punishment."
Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White each provided narrower grounds in support of
the Court's judgment. Both Justice Stewart's and Justice White's
concurrences suggested that if death sentences were imposed more
frequently, capital punishment would not be cruel and unusual
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.' 2 Justice Douglas's
concurrence also implied that the Constitution required a more equitable distribution of death sentences.'
Furman effectively abolished capital punishment in the United
States.' 4 Thus, for the first time in this nation's history, it was illegal
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240.

10 Though not formally joining in the concurrences, Justice Douglas indicated
an agreement with the views expressed in the opinions filed byJustices Stewart and

White. See id. at 248-49 n.11 (DouglasJ., concurring).
n See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359-61 (Marshall, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Marshall postulated that there were possibly six goals
served by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of recidivism,
encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy. See id. at

342 (Marshall,J., concurring). He leveled his most severe attack on the concept of
retribution as a permissible objective of the penal system and believed that there
was insufficient evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty. See id. at 34554 (Marshall, J., concurring). On the issue of recidivism, Justice Marshall stated
that the death sentence was excessive both because juries were not asked to con-

sider the issue when they decided to impose the sentence, and because most murderers are model prisoners. See id. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall quickly rejected the remaining possible rationales. See id. at 355-59 (Marshall,

J., concurring).
Commentators have also concluded that eugenics, judicial economy, and the
encouragement of guilty pleas do not provide a legal justification for capital punishment. See Michael H. Marcus & David S. Weissbrodt, The Death Penalty Cases, 56
CAL. L. REv. 1268, 1302-14 (1968).
12 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 311-14 (White,

J., concurring).
13 See id. at 255-57 (Douglas,J.,
concurring).
14 See id. at 240 (vacating judgment "insofar as it leaves undisturbed the
death
sentence imposed" and remanding pending capital cases for further proceedings).
In each of the cases then pending before it, the Court granted certiorari, reversed

the judgment as far as it left undisturbed the death sentence, and remanded the
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for a state to execute a defendant.'- The states then set about rewriting their capital sentencing laws, undoubtedly hoping to persuade at
leastJustice Douglas, Stewart, or White of the validity of their reconstituted laws. When the Court again addressed the issue, four years
later, Justice Douglas had resigned and Justice Stevens occupied his
seat. The Court used five cases - from Georgia, Florida, Texas,
North Carolina, and Louisiana - to address whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the death penalty as a criminal sanction.
The 1976 Cases

A.

The primary treatment of the meaning of the Eighth Amendment was developed in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg v.
Georgia,' 6 which adjudicated the constitutionality of Georgia's capital
punishment law. The opinion considered the historical origin of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Court's precedents
construing that provision. The plurality reasoned that the drafters of
the clause were primarily concerned with prohibiting torture and
other barbarous methods of punishment. The plurality then extracted two principles from the Court's cases. Contemporary values
concerning the infliction of the punishment were relevant to ensure
that the challenged sanction reflected the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 7 The sanction
also had to respect human dignity, and, thus, could not be excessive.
Detecting excessiveness required two further inquiries: First, the
punishment could not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain, and second, the punishment could not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.' 8
In considering whether the death penalty in the abstract violated the Eighth Amendment, the plurality considered Anglocase for further proceedings. See id. at 239-40 The decision impacted the death
sentences of the nation's 631 inmates then on death row. SeeJoel C. Moyer, Note,
The Death Penalty in Massachusetts,8 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 632, 639 (1974).

Chief Justice Burger predicted privately that there would never be another
execution in the United States. See BoB WOODWARD & Sco-r ARMSTRONG, THE
15

BRETHREN:

INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 259

(1979).

Interestingly, Justice Brennan

has related that one year earlier, after McGautha, he did not believe that there was
any hope that the Court would hold capital punishment unconstitutional. See WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 313, 321 (1986). Both Justices were only partially correct.
16 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Justices Powell and Stevens joined the opinion. This
same plurality of Justices announced the judgment of the Court in all of the 1976
capital punishment cases.
Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
is See id.
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American history, the text of the Constitution, and the Court's own
precedents, which had stated that the death penalty was not per se invalid. The plurality viewed the enactment of various capital punishment statutes in the four years since Furman as a manifestation of society's continuing approval of the death penalty. To determine
whether capital punishment comported with human dignity, the
plurality considered the penological justifications proffered for the
sanction. Justice Stewart noted that the death penalty was most frequently said to serve society's interest in retribution and deterrence,
and, to a lesser extent, to assure incapacitation and to prevent recidivism. Though statistical attempts to prove the deterrent effect of the
penalty were characterized as "inconclusive,"" the plurality did imagine murders that could be deterred by the death penalty:
There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for
hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the
cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. And there are
some categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner,
where other sanctions may not be adequate. 20
Thus, the plurality deferred to each legislature's determination
that executions for certain types of murders satisfied either retribution or deterrence. The plurality was unwilling to declare that the
death penalty was a punishment that could never be imposed no
matter the circumstances of the offense, the character of the offender, or the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose death."'
The plurality then reviewed each statutory scheme to determine
its constitutionality. Importantly, Furmanwas read as prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.'
The Georgia, 3 Florida, 4 and Texas statutes met that standard be19 See id. at 184-85.
20 Id. at
21

186.

See id. at 187.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.

See id. at 163-66. After convicting a defendant of a capital crime, Georgia's
statute required that the jury find one of the 10 statutory aggravating circumstances
and consider any mitigating circumstances in deciding on the appropriate sen23

tence. See id. at 164-66. The trial judge was bound by the jury's sentence. See id. at

166.

24 See Proffitt v. Florida,

428 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1976). Floridajuries also considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances when sentencing capital defendants.
See id. at 248. In Florida the trial judge decided on the sentence, after taking into
account the jury's recommendation on the issue. See id. at 249. If the jury recommended life imprisonment, the judge could impose the death sentence if "the facts
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cause they all provided for procedures to ensure that the decision to
impose a death sentence would be "suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.""
The two remaining capital punishment cases, Woodson v. North Carolina2 and Roberts v. Louisiana,8 involved statutes that required the
imposition of a death sentence upon conviction of a capital offense.
The plurality found both statutes to be unconstitutional, noting that
suggesting a sentence of death [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla.
1975)).
In Georgia and Florida, all death penalty appeals lay with the respective state
supreme court, which was to consider, among other things, whether the death sentence was appropriate in the case and consistent with the sentence imposed in similar cases. See id. at 250-51. The plurality viewed this appellate court review as an
additional guarantee that prevented a sentencer from wantonly and freakishly imposing a death sentence in a particular case. See id. at 258-60. The Court found
Georgia's capital sentencing scheme constitutional in Gregg. See id. at 253. Despite
the advisory nature of the jury verdict, the Court ruled Florida's capital sentencing
laws constitutional in Proffitt. See id.
25 SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
In Texas, death was a sentencing option for five kinds of intentional and knowing murders. See id. at 268. The categonies were: murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed during a kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for
remuneration; murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution; and murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a
prison employee. See id. If ajury found a defendant guilty of one of these murders,
thatjury would sentence him after a sentencing hearing. See id. at 267. At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense could introduce any relevant evidence.
See id. In deciding what sentence to impose, the jury had to answer 'yes" to three
statutory questions before it could impose a death sentence. See id. at 269.
In Jurek, the plurality reasoned that the five categories of capital murder
served the function of narrowing the categories of death-eligible murders, similar to
the statutory aggravated circumstances listed in the Georgia and Florida statutes.
See id. at 270. The plurality also noted that the Texas courts had treated the second
of the three questions posed to the jury after a verdict of guilty as an opportunity for
the defense to place before the jury any existing mitigating evidence. See id. at 27273. This process ensured that the jury had guided and focused consideration of the
facts of the crime and the circumstances of the individual before it sentenced the
defendant. See id. at 273-74. The plurality rejected the argument that the second
statutory question, which focused on the future dangerousness of the defendant,
was invalid because it was impossible for a sentencer to predict future behavior. See
id. at 275-76. Predicting future behavior was an essential element in many decisions
made in the criminal litigation process, such as whether to grant a defendant bail,
what type of punishment to impose upon conviction, and whether to grant parole to
an offender. Texas's capital sentencing procedure was sufficient because the jury
would have "before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine" prior to imposing a proper sentence. Id. at 276.
26 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189; see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253; Jurek,
428 U.S. at 27374.
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
28 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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juries historically sentenced only a small number of defendants to
death, and, to accommodate this practice, states continuously
granted juries greater discretion in determining the appropriate
punishment in capital cases. Mandatory death penalty statutes did
not reflect this contemporary standard of decency.'
In sum, Furmanprovided an unclear resolution of whether capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. It was four years
before the Court clarified the issue in five cases in 1976. Those five
cases outlined the principles and considerations relevant in deciding
an Eighth Amendment claim. The Court determined that history
and judicial interpretation of the Amendment, as well as then-recent
legislative enactments and jury verdicts in capital cases, demonstrated that death was still a publicly approved method of punishment. Capital punishment's penological objectives of deterrence
and retribution could be achieved best in a limited class of cases: the
carefully contemplated murder and cases in which a sentence less
than death would not be adequate, perhaps because of the defendant's character. To ensure consistent imposition of the death penalty, sentencers should have objective standards. These objective
standards would also facilitate judicial review of death sentences.
Proffitt v. Fordia" and Jurek v. Texas3' suggested that the Eighth
Amendment did not eliminate all flexibility in how states could design their capital punishment laws. As underscored by Woodson and
Roberts, sentencers had to consider the character and record of each
convicted defendant and the circumstances of the particular crime
before imposing a death sentence. At bottom, the 1976 cases suggested that the death penalty was a sanction reserved for a limited

29 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05; Roberts, 428
U.S. at 336. Moreover, it was
likely that jurors would consider the sentence that would be imposed when adjudicating the defendant's guilt. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. Mandatory death penalty

statutes would thus encourage jurors to nullify the law if they believed a death sentence was not the appropriate punishment, notwithstanding sufficient proof to convict the defendant of the capital offense.

See id. at 302-03. Though a mandatory

sentencing process might increase the number of persons sentenced to death and
thus address Justices Douglas's, Stewart's, and White's concerns expressed in Furman, the Court ruled it violated the essential holding of Furman because there were

no objective standards that guided, regularized, and made rationally reviewable the
process the jury used to decide which defendants to sentence to death. See id. at
303. Another defect in mandatory death penalty statutes was that they did not allow
for particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of
the defendant, and the circumstances of the crime, before imposing a death sentence. See id. at 303-04.

428 U.S. 242 (1976).
31 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30
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class of criminal defendants: murderers who could be deterred and
killers whose conduct merited retribution.
B. Eighth Amendment Limits on Death Eligibility
Since its initial ruling on the issue in 1976, the Court has, on
seven other occasions, revisited the question of whether executing a
particular class of defendants is consistent with the Eighth Amendment.32 Those seven cases - Coker v. Georgia," Enmund v. Florida,4
2

By 1987, most of the major issues on death eligibility had been resolved. One

issue that remains somewhat unsettled is whether a conviction for treason can be
punished with the death penalty. The common law suggests that it may be not be
disproportionate punishment to execute those convicted of treason, even if no one
died as a result of the treason. See Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 347
(1870) ("No crime is greater than treason" which threatens the very existence of the
nation.). Commentators are divided on whether such punishment is permissible.
Compare Paul D. Kamenar, Death Penalty Legislation for Espionage and Other Federal
Crimes is Unnecessary: It Just Needs a Little Re-Enforcement, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 881

(1989) (arguing that execution of defendants convicted of espionage is constitutionally permissible), with James C. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 99 (1983) (noting

that the Constitution prohibits execution for treason, unless a death occurred).
33 433 U.S. 584 (1977). At issue in Coker was whether the death penalty was the
appropriate proportionate punishment for a defendant who did not kill. See id. at
586. Coker was sentenced to death for raping an adult woman. See id. at 587-91.
The Court's plurality opinion noted that in the previous 50 years state legislatures
had infrequently authorized death as a punishment for rape. See id. at 595. The
Court also noted that international legal developments evidenced the same trend.
See id. at 596 n.10. Juries rarely imposed death sentences on rapists. Further, in
Georgia, before deliberate killers received a death sentence, the jury had to find at
least one aggravating circumstance and, even then, the murderer had the opportunity to argue in mitigation of a death sentence. See id. at 598. Rapists, however,
might receive a death sentence even if they did not take the life of their victim and
the state did not have to establish an aggravating circumstance. The plurality refused to accept punishing rape, which it characterized as "[s]hort of homicide ...
the ultimate violation of self," more severely than deliberate killings. See id. at 597
(citations omitted). Accordingly, sentencing a rapist to death was deemed disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 600. The punishment imposed in Coker failed to satisfy the
proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 592. The plurality thus did not consider whether the punishment served the legitimate ends of
punishment - retribution or deterrence and whether the death penalty
achieved those ends. Coker demonstrates that proportionality - standing alone serves as a limiting principle on the constitutional availability of the death penalty.
34
458 U.S. 782 (1982). In this case the Court addressed whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who
did not kill, attempt to kill, intend that a killing take place, or intend to use lethal
force, yet who aided in the commission of a felony, during which an accomplice
killed another. See id. at 787. The Court reviewed the legislative treatment of nontriggermen felony murderers and considered the instances in which juries sentenced them to death. See id. at 789-93. The majority of states at the time did not

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 29:147

Tison v. Arizona,-" Ford v. Wainwright, Penry v. Lynaugh, 7 Thompson v.
Oklahoma,' and Stanford v. Kentucky,"9 - establish the substantive limprovide for capital punishment in such situations. See id. Juries were loath to impose the death sentence on non-triggermen felony murderers in the absence of
finding that they hired or solicited someone to kill the victim or participated in a
scheme designed to kill the victim. See id. at 794-96. The Court ruled that executing non-triggermen felony murderers did not serve either retribution or deterrence. See id. at 798-801. The threat of the death penalty was not a deterrent for
those who committed capital crimes without intending to take another's life or who
did not contemplate the use of lethal force. See id. at 799-800. Executing nontriggermen for killings that they did not commit or killings they did not intend to
commit or cause, did not advance retributionism because the death penalty would
not ensure that that criminal received his just deserts. See id. at 801. International
legal developments were "not irrelevant," as the Court noted that many British
Commonwealth countries and continental Europe had abolished or restricted the
felony murder doctrine. See id. at 796-97 & n.22. In light of all these factors, the
Court reversed the death sentence. See id. at 801.
35 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
Tson also addressed the propriety of imposing a death
sentence on a non-triggerman felony murderer. As in Enmund, the Court reviewed
the treatment of the issue by the state legislatures and state court opinions. See id. at
152-55. In contrast to Enmund, the Tison Court concluded that sentencers were not
reluctant to impose the death sentence on a defendant who had participated in a
violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human
life. See id. at 154-55. The Court opined that a defendant who exhibited a reckless
indifference to the value of human life may be as morally reprehensible as a defendant who intended to kill his victim. See id. at 157. Reckless indifference was a sufficiently culpable mental state that sentencers could consider when sentencing the
defendant. See id. at 157-58. Thus, after T/son, defendants may receive a death sentence, if they had a substantial role in the offense and were at least reckless as to
whether a death would occur from their activities. See id. at 158. Although less clear
on the point, Tison suggests that if the defendant has a culpable mental state as to
the killing, a death sentence might also satisfy retributive principles. See id.
36 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Ford held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane. See id. at 401. In resolving the issue, the Court first looked
to English common law and the contemporary practices in the states. See id. at 40609. These inquiries revealed that neither the common law, nor any state law,
authorized executions of the insane. See id. Various rationales for the common law
rule existed, including that executing an insane person did not provide an example
to others. See id. at 407. For that reason, executing the insane did not contribute to
the deterrence value of capital punishment. See id. Similarly, because an insane
inmate did not appreciate the reason for the punishment, execution did not have a
retributive impact. See id. at 408. Due to a virtual unanimity of both the common
law and contemporary practices, the Court ruled that execution of the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 409-10.
37 492 U.S. 302 (1992).
Penry was mentally retarded. See id. at 307-08. In deciding whether the Eighth Amendment permitted the execution of the mentally
retarded, the Court considered the English common law at the time that the Eighth
Amendment was adopted. To ascertain contemporary values, the Court also analyzed current legislation and recent jury decisions. See id. at 329-35. The common
law prohibited the execution of "idiots," who were generally described as persons
who lacked an understanding of good and evil or who could not distinguish the two
ideas. See id. at 331-32. In considering whether the execution of a mentally retarded person satisfied retributionism or deterrence, a majority of the Justices could

1998]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

its of death eligibility. More significantly, despite the passage of time
and changes in the Court's personnel, throughout the various issues
that the Court has faced, the tests announced in Gregg and Coker continue to comprise most of the substantive limits of death eligibility
under the Eighth Amendment. To determine whether executing a
class of defendants accords with the evolving standards of decency or
whether the death penalty is excessive punishment as applied to that
class of defendants, the Court looks to history, judicial precedent,
statutes, jury verdicts in capital cases, and whether deterrence or retribution will be achieved by the execution. International law has informed some decisions. No one factor is dispositive.4° The death
penalty may be excessive either because (1) the penalty does not
meaningfully achieve either deterrence or retribution (but generally
not agree. See id. at 306. A plurality stated that the Eighth Amendment did not
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. See id. at 340. Thus, after Penty,
the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the execution of the mentally retarded if
the defendant had the requisite mental culpability when committing the capital offense. See id.
487 U.S. 815 (1988). At issue in Thompson was the execution of defendants
who were 15 years old when they committed a capital crime. See id. at 818-19. A
plurality canvassed the laws of the states that regulated "adult" activities. See id. at
821-31. Included in the survey were the 18 states that had specifically established a
minimum age in their death penalty statutes and the 14 states without capital punishment. The plurality also considered the frequency with which juries imposed
death sentences on those under 16 years old and whether executing those under
age 16 at the time of the offense achieved retribution or deterrence. See id. at 82638. The Court concluded that there was a national consensus that prohibited the
execution of those younger than 15. See id. at 838. The Court based this decision
partly on the relative infrequency of death sentences imposed on 15-year-old defendants, and partly on the proposition that executions did not deter or satisfy retribution. See id. at 833-38.
3s
492 U.S. 361 (1989). In contrast to Thompson, the Stanford plurality, different
from that which announced the Court'sjudgment in Thompson, concluded that executing capital defendants who were at least 16 years old at the time of the capital
offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 380. The plurality relied
on basically the same legislative pronouncements and statistics on jury verdicts that

were instructive in Thompson and concluded that the defendants had failed to carry
their burden of proving that there was a nationwide consensus against capital punishment being imposed on 16- and 17-year-old defendants. See id. at 370-80. The
Stanford plurality did not consider the defendant's argument that the death penalty
did not either deter other 16- or 17-year-olds or further retributive objectives. See id.
at 377-78.
40 At bottom, determining whether a particular
class of defendants can be executed is as much a product of each Justice's own values as it is an analysis of the articulated factors that make up the Court's test. But see Susan Raeker-Jordan, A ProDeath, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evoluing Standard of
Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 555-56 (1996) (arguing
that the evolving standards of decency formula is structured to favor imposition of
the death penalty).
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both) ,4 or (2) the penalty is grossly out of proportion to the severity
In either instance, the punishment violates the
of the crime.
Eighth Amendment because executing the defendant involves unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
The six-factor test was promulgated in Gregg when the Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment was not limited to punishment
used at the time the framers wrote the Constitution. As a guide for
future cases, these factors are designed to ensure that answers to
Eighth Amendment questions are based on "objective" standards
and not on the predilections of the individual Justices." Since announcing these factors, however, the Court has not discussed either
the aims of the Eighth Amendment or the objectives of capital punishment. In the seven subsequent cases on death eligibility, the
Court all but mechanically looked to whether each factor was established before deciding whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited
executing that class of defendants. Addressing the question of inordinate delay between imposing a death sentence and executing the
defendant presents the courts with another opportunity to consider
the justifications for capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment
restrictions on that penalty.
C. CollateralConsequences of Punishmentas Violative of the Eighth
Amendment
Since Gregg, the Court, in seven non-capital cases, has outlined
the contours of the Eighth Amendment relative to the collateral
consequences of an inmate's confinement. 45 These cases can be
separated into two, sometimes overlapping, categories: One group
deals with the conduct of prison officials toward the inmate, and the
second group concerns the permissible conditions under which inmates may be confined. Under either theory, the Eighth Amend-

See Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-10; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-87 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976). See also Harvey D. Ellis,
Jr., Commentary, ConstitutionalLaw: The Death Penalty: A Critique of the Philosophical
Bases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirementsfor ItsJustification, 34 OKLA. L.
REv. 567, 597 (1981) (asserting that noJustice has stated that social utility alone is a
sufficientjustification for capital punishment).
42
SeeCokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 & n.4 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
43
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
4 See id. at 173, 175-76.
4
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 27
(1993); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294
(1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
(1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
41
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ment is violated if the claimed deprivation is objectively cruel and
unusual, and prison officials acted with the requisite culpable mental
state in bringing about the deprivation.46
The first group of cases addressed how inmates are personally
treated. For example, in Hudson v. McMillian47 a handcuffed and orderly prisoner was denied his Eighth Amendment rights when a
guard "maliciously and sadistically" punched him, causing "minor
bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip," loosening his teeth,
8 Another way that prison
and cracking his partial dental plate.4
officials might violate the Eighth Amendment is if, as in Farmer v. Brennan,4 9 they are deliberately indifferent to the plight of a preoperative
transsexual who exhibits feminine characteristics, and after they
place that prisoner in the general prison population, the prisoner is
assaulted and raped. This conduct violates the Eighth Amendment
because "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." 50 In Helling v. McKinney,5 the prison officials' deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of a serious harm that could befall an
inmate placed in a cell in which he was exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke, a dangerous health condition, violated the Eighth
Amendment. Similar to Farmer, the judgment in Helling was premised on the notion that when a prison official exposes an inmate to
potential health hazards, the official has acted beyond the authority
delegated by the sentencing authority.
The second group of cases discussed the conditions of an inmate's confinement. For instance, in Hutto v. Finney2 the Court considered an appeal from a district court order finding that the conditions in two Arkansas prisons violated the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The appellants did not contest this finding and the Court observed that the district court's order noted the
"inmates' diet, the continued overcrowding, the rampant violence,
the vandalized cells, and the 'lack of professionalism and good
judgment on the part of maximum security personnel."'" Rhodes v.

See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991).
503 U.S. 1 (1992).
48 See id. at
4.
49 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
50 See id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
5, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
52 437 U.S. 678
(1978).
46

47

53 Id. at 687 (citations omitted).
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Chapman' decided that housing two inmates in a single cell was not
cruel and unusual punishment. In making this ruling, the Court
modified the familiar Eighth Amendment test: "Conditions [of confinement] must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime warranting imprisonment."55 The Court has thus far interpreted the Eighth Amendment to cover those confinement conditions that "have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise"" and has stated that harsh conditions of confinement do
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 5 In short, these non-capital
cases establish Eighth Amendment limits on the treatment of prisoners, with a particular focus on how their incarceration affects
them. These same strictures should apply in capital cases. A capital
defendant's inordinate stay on death row might impose consequential effects on that inmate - which are beyond the sentence authorized by the law - and, therefore, violate the "evolving standards of
decency" of Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence.
Mental strain is the most obvious collateral consequence experienced by capital defendants on death row for an inordinate period
of time. Typically, death row inmates are confined to their cells for
the great majority of each day and have relatively limited opportunities to exercise or communicate with other inmates or individuals
from outside the prison. Research on the impact of this confinement indicates that inmates exhibit several emotional and psychological stages.58 Capital defendants have been described as experi452 U.S. 337 (1981).
55

Id. at 347.

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
See Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 141 (1979) [hereinafter Johnson, Under Sentence of
Death]. Robert Johnson interviewed 35 Alabama death row inmates in 1978 to
gauge how they coped while in confinement. See id. At the outset, inmates manifested "emotional denial" of their capital sentence. See id. at 145. After the shock of
receiving a death sentence wore off, most prisoners became introspective. See id.
During this period, some inmates appeared nonchalant and immune to anxiety,
depression, or fear. See id. Johnson surmised that this nonchalance may have
stemmed from a belief that a commutation or successful appeal was imminent. See
57

id.

Other inmates had a contrary reaction to their confinement. This second set
of inmates displayed a feverish concern for day-to-day matters, or an "excessive preoccupation with appeals, religion, or intellectual pursuits." Id. A few other death
row inmates "retreat[ed] into a private psychotic world" in which they imagined
themselves exempt from execution. Id.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1998]

encing a "living death." Years ago, Albert Camus wrote of the "two
deaths" that are imposed on a person sentenced to death and confined to death row."9 These debilitating effects have, of late, been
classified by some courts as the "death row phenomenon. " "° The
death row phenomenon is an ancillary, unauthorized corollary of a
death sentence. The anguish suffered during the inordinate delay
makes "no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering." 61 When it is experienced beyond
that which is necessary, the death row phenomenon should be
viewed as an excessive form of punishment. As such, a state may,
over time, forfeit its ability to go forward with an apparently lawfully
imposed death sentence because the execution now violates the
Eighth Amendment.

After extended periods of confinement, some inmates became suspicious, resentful, and hostile toward others. See id. This third group of inmates externalized
responsibility and blame for their confinement. See id. They emerged transformed
from "dissolute criminals into martyrs, adding a dimension of meaning and dignity
to their lives." Id. See generally ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE
MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS (1990); ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE
UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981); BRUCE JACKSON 9c DIANE CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row
(1980).
59 See ALBERT CAmUS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE

25-29 (Richard Howard

trans., 1960). According to Camus:
A murdered man is generally rushed to his death, even at the height
of his terror of the mortal violence being done to him, without knowing what is happening: the period of his horror is only that of life itself, and his hope of escaping whatever madness has pounced upon
him probably never deserts him. For the man condemned to death,
on the other hand, the horror of his situation is served up to him at
every moment for months on end. Torture by hope alternates only
with the pangs of animal despair. His lawyer and his confessor, out of
simple humanity, and his guards, to keep him docile, unanimously assure him that he will be reprieved. He believes them with all his
heart, yet he cannot believe them at all. He hopes by day, despairs by
night. And as the weeks pass his hope and despair increase proportionately, until they become equally insupportable. According to all
accounts, the color of his skin changes: fear acts like an acid. "It's
nothing to know if you're going to die," one such man in the Fresnes
prison said, "but not to know if you're going to live is the real torture."

. .

. As a general rule, the man is destroyed by waiting for his

execution long before he is actually killed. Two deaths are imposed,
and the first one is worse than the second, though the culprit has
killed but once. Compared to this torture, the law of retaliation seems
like a civilized principle.
Id.
See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).

61 Cokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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III. DEFENDANTS ALLEGING TIME AWAITING EXECUTION AS CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The following section surveys some of the cases of capital defendants who have asserted that the state has forfeited the right to
execute them. Most cases that give rise to inordinate delay have both
procedural and substantive shortcomings. These flaws often do not
themselves disqualify the defendant from being sentenced to death.
For decades, more capital defendants have been sentenced to
death than have been executed. Some believed, however, that after
Gregg's resolution of the general constitutionality of capital punishment, defendants would be executed at a rate that existed before the
federal courts expressed doubts about the lawfulness of the death
penalty. This belief proved misplaced. Five years after Gregg, three
executions had occurred, despite an increase of hundreds of inmates
sentenced to death.6" The lack of executions was discussed in an interchange between Justices Rehnquist and Stevens in Coleman v.
Balkcom,64 a case in which the Supreme Court did not grant plenary
review.
The Court, by a six-three vote, denied Wayne Carl Coleman's
certiorari petition to review the denial of his state post-conviction petition. Most noteworthy was Justice Rehnquist's explanation for his
vote to grant certiorari." He argued that the Court should grant the
certiorari petition because denying it would not, in all likelihood,
end the litigation. Rehnquist anticipated that after the denial of certiorari, Coleman would pursue the same claims in a federal habeas
62

See NATIONAL

PRISONER STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

1930-1970, at 8 tbl. 1,

9 tbl. 2 (1971).
s See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) (Marshall,J, dissenting).
451 U.S. 949 (1981).
65 Justice Marshalljoined byjustice Brennan, voted to grant the petition. See id.
at 953-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that together the statutes violated Coleman's federal due process rights. See id. at 955-56 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The capital nature of the case seemingly prompted Justice Marshall's
dissent, and he stressed the limited issue that the case presented. According tojustice Marshall:
It would not be necessary to hold that compulsory process is constitutionally required in any other civil, or indeed, in any other habeas
proceeding. It would instead be sufficient.., to recognize the unique
character of the death penalty and of the restraints required by the
Constitution before the State may impose it. Granting the assistance
of compulsory process to an individual under sentence of death but
ready and willing to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the manner of his conviction might well be among those restraints.
Id.
66 See id. at 956 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
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petition. According to Rehnquist, the Court had reached a stalemate in the administration of constitutional law regarding capital
punishment. The death penalty had become "virtually an illusion"
due to the "endlessly drawn out legal proceedings," as few of the inmates on death row appeared to face any imminent prospect of having their sentence carried out.6 7 The Justice held the Court respon-

sible for "this mockery of our criminal justice system."" Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the Court grant certiorari in all capital
cases and address the issues raised by those defendants. In the Justice's view, this procedure would end the federal courts' jurisdiction
over some death row cases and place the inmate's fate in the hands
of the state officials, who could then decide whether to carry out the
sentence or afford the prisoner other relief.69 In response to Justice
Rehnquist's memorandum, Justice Stevens noted that, from Furman
through 1981, the Court had decided several novel constitutional issues related to capital punishment. With the resolution of those issues, Justice Stevens surmised, " [o]ne therefore should not assume
that the delays of the past few years will necessarily be reflected in
the future if the various state authorities act with all possible diligence." ° While acknowledging that housing inmates permanently
on death row did not further the death penalty as a deterrent, Justice
Stevens thought that it was inevitable that there would be a significant period of incarceration during the interval between sentencing
and execution. Although he was uncertain how promptly a diligent
prosecutor could complete all of the proceedings necessary to carry
out a death sentence, Justice Stevens nonetheless concurred in the
67

Id. at 958 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).

68

Id.

A few years later, ChiefJustice Burger also began publicly to express exasperation with the delay between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution.
In Sullivan v. Wainwright,464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983), the ChiefJustice wrote:
69

I emphasize that this case has been in the courts for ten years and is
here for the fourth time. This alone demonstrates the speciousness of
the suggestion that there has been a "rush to judgment." The argument so often advanced by the dissenters that capital punishment is
cruel and unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death row
inflicted upon this guilty defendant by lawyers seeking to turn the
administration ofjustice into the sporting contest Roscoe Pound denounced three-quarters of a century ago.
Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of application for stay); see also Gray v.
Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of petition
for certiorari and denial of application for stay) ("This case illustrates a recent pattern of calculated efforts to frustrate valid judgments after painstaking judicial review over a number of years; at some point there must be finality.").
70
Coleman, 451 U.S. at 951 (StevensJ., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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denial of the certiorari petition because he believed that it was unwise to experiment with capital cases by adopting accelerated review
procedures.7 1
This exchange between Justices Rehnquist and Stevens not only
highlights the lack of executions after Gregg, but also evidences insights on the role of the federal courts in the capital litigation process. 72 One of the reasons for the delay in executions was the exploration by federal and state courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
state legislatures of the boundaries the 1976 cases mandated. The
lack of a large increase in executions from 1976 to 1981 suggested
that if a defendant challenged his conviction or sentence, it would
generally take more than five years before the case completed state
and federal post-conviction review. Supporters of capital punishment may well have wondered whether the frequency of executions
would ever approach the pre-Furman rate, after the adjudication of
most of the major legal issues." Today, after most legal issues have
been resolved,74 most federal courts have adopted special local rules
that regularize the consideration of capital cases.7 - These rules gen71

See id. At about the same timeJustice Marshall argued that the lack of execu-

tions was another demonstration of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. See
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 438-40 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted: "And
while hundreds have been placed on death row in the years since Gregg, only three
persons have been executed. Two of them made no effort to challenge their sentence and were thus permitted to commit what I have elsewhere described as
'state-administered suicide.'" Id. at 439.
72 Discussions between judges concerning the
administration of capital punishment and the years that it takes to litigate such cases have not been limited to the
United States Reports. See, e.g., Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1292-94
(9th Cir.) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989);
id. at 1298-99 (Trott, J., concurring); see also State v. Steffen, 639 N.E.2d 67 (Ohio)
(considering delay in several Ohio cases), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 895 (1994).
7s In 1983, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court
considered the
procedures federal courts might employ in deciding whether to issue a stay of execution to federal habeas petitioners under a state death sentence. See Barefoot, 463
U.S. at 892-96. Although the Court affirmed the dismissal of a habeas petition, it
noted: "It is a matter of public record that an increasing number of deathsentenced petitioners are entering the appellate stages of the federal habeas process." Id. at 892. In apparent anticipation of these cases, the Court outlined procedures for federal courts to use in deciding stays of execution and appeals from the
denial of such stays. See id. at 892-96.
74 But see supra note 32 (noting that the issue of death eligibility
for espionage
and treason remains unsettled).
75 Notwithstanding the promulgation of these local rules, delays do occur
in the
federal courts. In In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236 (1992) (per curiam), for example, a
Washington jury convicted Charles Rodman Campbell in 1982 of multiple murders
and sentenced him to death. See Blodgett, 502 U.S. at 237. That conviction became
final in April 1985 when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for
certiorari. See id. In July 1985, Campbell filed a federal habeas petition, which was
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erally provide for notification to the clerk of the appropriate court of
appeals when a death penalty habeas petition is filed in a district
court within the circuit.
Since Gregg, prosecutors have sought the death penalty; sentencers have on occasion imposed death sentences; the courts have,
with some frequency, affirmed those convictions and sentences; and
some states have executed capital defendants. For instance, from
1977 through June 1998, on average, annually 300 people received a
death sentence. During this period, 467 executions occurred."
eventually denied. See id. Campbell filed a second federal habeas petition in March
1989, and it was denied within a month by the district court. See id. An appeal followed and a stay of execution was granted. See id. The case was argued in June
1989. See id. In April 1990 and October 1990, the Washington Attorney General
sent letters to the court, inquiring about the status of the appeal. See id. Neither
letter was answered. See id. In July 1990, and again in September 1990, Campbell
moved to withdraw some of the issues in his petition from the panel's consideration. See id. The court of appeals later permitted Campbell to discharge his attorneys and proceed pro se and to file a third federal habeas petition. See id. at 238.
On occasion, a substantial period elapses while the case is pending in the federal district court. The federal habeas petitions of C. Michael Anderson and Peter
Hochstein reportedly have been pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska for over 11 years. SeeJoy Powell, Stenberg Asks for Deadline on Decision: Death-Row Appeal in Courtfor 11 Years, OMAHAWoRLD-HERALD,June 2, 1995, at
19. In re Michael Dutton, 1993 U.S. APP. LExIs 29300 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1993), involved a habeas petition filed by Ronald E. Rickman, which had been pending on
the docket of the district court for seven years. See id. at *1. The petition was
lengthy and raised four broad claims - "ineffective assistance of counsel, unconstitutionality of the Tennessee death penalty, denial of due process at trial and on appeal, and [the petitioner's] competency to stand trial." Id. at *2. The districtjudge
ruled on a few procedural motions, and in the interim, the petitioner exhausted
some other issues, and sought to file an amended habeas petition. See id. Subsequently, the Tennessee Attorney General applied for a writ of mandamus. On November 9, 1993, the Sixth Circuit issued the mandamus and directed the district
judge to hold a trial on the issues raised by the petition or otherwise to dispose of
the petition within 180 days of the date of the mandamus order. See id. at *5. The
stay of execution entered by the district court was ordered vacated if there were neither a trial nor other disposition of the petition within the designated time period.
See id. In September 1994, the districtjudge granted the habeas petition. See Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1827 (1998).
76 See, e.g., 3D CIR. Loc. APP. R. 8.2; 3D CIR. Misc. Loc. AP. R. 111.0-111.8;
4TH
CIR. R. 22(B); 4TH CIR. INT. Op. PRoc. 22.2,22.3; 5TH CIR. R. 8.12; 5TH CIR. INrr. OP.
PROC.; 6TH CIR. R. 28; 7TH CIR. R. 22; 8TH CIR. R. 22A; 9TH CIR. R. 22-1-22-5; 10TH
CIR. R. 22.2; 1 1TH CIR. R. 22-1-22-3.
The case is assigned to a panel of appellate judges in the event of an appeal.
This panel generally hears all subsequent appeals. As a result, federal appellate
court judges generally know when a death penalty habeas petition is filed in a district court within their circuit. This panel also receives copies of most of the filings
in the case, and thus is aware of the major issues in the case even before the district
judge rules on the petition.
See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEAT Row, U.S.A. 1 (July
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There has been an increase in executions in the United States since
1983. From 1977 to 1983 there were eleven executions, an average
of 1.6 executions per year, but from 1984 through mid-1998 there
were 453 executions, an annual average of thirty-one executions for
those fourteen and one-half years. 78 These executions have typically
occurred roughly seven years from the defendant's receipt of a death
sentence. 79 Despite the increase in the number of defendants executed, significantly more defendants receive a death sentence each
year than are executed. Thus, at the present rate, even if the state
and federal courts have abandoned the rigorous scrutiny of capital
cases exemplified in the 1976 cases,8 it is a certainty that most individuals sentenced to death will spend several years on death row before execution, if they are ever executed. In short, the capital litigation system has not fulfilled Justice Stevens's prediction that the time
necessary for judicial consideration of death penalty cases would
eventually shorten. Considering the number of years that inmates
typically spend on death row before execution, it was inevitable that
a defendant would legally challenge this state of affairs. On March
27, 1995, Justice Stevens gave new attention to this claim. That day
the Court denied Clarence Allen Lackey's petition for a writ of certiorari. 8 '
A.

ClarenceAllen Lackey

Lackey claimed that it was cruel and unusual punishment for
the state to execute him after a seventeen-year delay between his
conviction and date of execution. In 1983, after his first conviction
1, 1998) [hereinafter DEATH Row, U.S.A.].
78 See id. at 8. In 1997 there were 71 executions, which exceeded
the previous
annual post-Furmanrecord of 56, established in 1995. See id.
79 See Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed orJustice Denied? -

A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1665 n.3 (1990)

(citing American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, Task Force on Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus, Towards a MoreJust and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, Recommendations and Report of the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus 33 n.12, 337-38 & n.75 (Aug. 1990) (observing an average time of six and
one-half years from death sentence to execution); AD Hoc COMMr=TE ON FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT ON HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPIrrAL CASES
(noting an average time of over eight years from crime to execution)).
so Some have suggested that in 1983 the Supreme Court began
to retreat from
the principles announced in its 1976 cases. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, Death at Any
Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985); RaymondJ. Pascussi, Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv.
1129 (1984); Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305.
81 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045 (1995).
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was reversed, Lackey was convicted and sentenced to death for killing
Diane Kumph six years earlier. A divided Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1989.2 Though the
affirmance was based on questionable reasoning," Lackey's conviction became final in December 1991.84 His execution was first
scheduled forJuly 1992. The date was then changed to allow him to
investigate and litigate a state habeas corpus petition. After the denial of two state and one federal habeas petitions, he petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In March 1995,
the Court denied the petition, and Justice Stevens filed his memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari."
Justice Stevens described the claim asserting inordinate delay as
"novel," but "not without foundation." The Justice noted that Gregg
stated that capital punishment might satisfy retribution and deterrence, and that it was arguable whether either ground retained force
for prisoners on death row for seventeen years. According to Justice
Stevens, a delay of this length was rare when the Constitution was
written, and Lackey's continuous confinement on death row arguably satisfied retribution. Citing In re Medley," in which the Court
mentioned that a defendant waiting on death row for the fulfillment
of a death sentence experiences great uncertainty, Justice Stevens
said that the same uncertainty "should apply with even greater force
in the case of delays that last for many years." 87 Justice Stevens suggested that an execution after an inmate had spent many years on
death row might have a small deterrent impact in comparison to the
continued incarceration of the inmate. Justice Stevens noted that
Lackey's argument drew further strength from the conclusion of the
Privy Council, which had interpreted section 10 of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, the recognized precursor of the Eighth Amendment,
as prohibiting long delays between the death sentence and execu-

83

See Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
See id. at 122-23 (Clinton,J, dissenting). Judge Clinton believed that the ma-

jority had given undue weight to a passage in a United States Supreme Court plurality opinion and that the majority's analysis was not the application of the actual law,
but was rather an anticipation of how the Court would rule on a similar issue then
pending before the United States Supreme Court. See id.
See id. at 128. The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently granted Lackey's
motion for a rehearing and, in May 1991, again affirmed Lackey's conviction and
sentence. See id.
85
See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
134 U.S. 160 (1890).
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046 (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial
of
certiorari).
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tion." Closely related to the issue presented in Lackey's petition was
the question of which portion of the delay should be considered.
Justice Stevens suggested that it may be appropriate to distinguish
among delays resulting from the prisoner's abuse of the judicial
process by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; his legitimate exercise of his right to review; and negligence or deliberate action by the
state. In closing, Justice Stevens wrote, "Petitioner's claim, with its
legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching consequences,
seems an ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study [in the state and federal courts] .""

Lackey was not the first death row inmate to argue that due to
the delay the state had caused in carrying out his sentence, Eighth
Amendment principles should prohibit the state from executing
him. More than three decades ago, a notorious death row prisoner
made a similar claim.
B.

Caryl Whittier Chessman

In 1948, Caryl Whittier Chessman was convicted and sentenced
to death for crimes committed by a man dubbed the "Red Light
Bandit."90 For the next twelve years, Chessman claimed that his conviction should be reversed because he was denied due process, based
on the manner by which his trial transcript was constructed.9 ' He
had mixed success.92 By 1959, Chessman was also asserting that his
88

See id. at 1047 (citing Riley v. Attorney General ofJamaica, 3 All E.R. 469, 478

(P.C. 1983) (Lord Scarman, dissenting, joined by Lord Brightman)).
Id. at 1047. Lackey's inordinate delay claim was ultimately unsuccessful. See
Lackey v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996). He was
executed on May 20, 1997. See Michael Graczyk, Murdereron Death Row for 19 Years is
Executed for Lubbock Slaying, AuSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, May 21, 1997, at B2; see also

White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.) (denying a petition asserting that a 17-year
stay on death row was unconstitutional), reh'g denied, 85 F.3d 627, cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 275 (1996).
90 See generally EDMUND C. BROwN & DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY:
A GOVERNOR'S

EDUCATION ON DEATH Row 20-52 (1989); ERIc CUMMINS, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CALIFORNIA'S RADICAL PRISON MOVEMENT 33-62 (1994). See also WILLIAM M.
KUNSTLER, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? THE ORIGINAL TRIAL OF CARYL CHESSMAN

(1961).
91
See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 158 (1957). The court reporter died
soon after the jury returned its verdict, but before his notes had been transcribed
into a trial transcript. See id. A substitute court reporter prepared a trial transcript
using the original reporter's notes, the trial judge's notes, and the prosecutor's assistance. See id. at 159. Chessman received a copy in prison and he objected, claiming that the transcript was inaccurate and incomplete. See id. at 159-60. Based on
these objections, the trial judge made some corrections Chessman suggested and
certified the transcript for appeal. See id. at 160.
92
See id. at 161 & n.6. In 1957, on appeal from the denial of a federal habeas
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continued confinement was unlawful. The California Supreme
Court stated: "It is, of course, in fact unusual that a man should be
detained for more than 11 years pending execution of a sentence of
death and we have no doubt that mental suffering attends such detention. " "' The court concluded that under the circumstances of the

case, Chessman was not subjected to cruel or unusual punishment.
The next year, in one of his final efforts to avoid execution, Chessman renewed the delay claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
In an opinion dated February 8, 1960, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals responded:
It may show a basic weakness in our government system that a
case like this takes so long, but I do not see how we can offer life
(under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the
processes for a given number of years, especially when in the end
it appears the prisoner never really had any good points. If we
did offer such a prize what would be the cutoff date? I would
think that the number of years would have to be objective and
arbitrary.
But counsel for petitioner suggest that we take a subjective
approach on this man's case. We are told of his agonies on death
row. True, it would be hell for most people. But here is no ordinary man. In his appearances in court one sees an arrogant,
truculent man, the same qualities that [his sexual assault victims]
Regina and Mary met, spewing vitriol on one person after another. We see an exhibitionist who never before had such opportunities for exhibition. (All this I get from the record.) And, I
think he has heckled his keepers long enough.94

corpus petition, Chessman persuaded a majority of the United States Supreme
Court that he should have had a hearing on whether the preparation of the state
court record accorded with federal due process. See id. at 157. By that time, Chessman had discovered that the substitute reporter was related by marriage to the trial
prosecutor, and had worked in close collaboration with the prosecutor and two police officers on their trial testimony. See id.
at 161. In remanding the case the Court
wrote:
All we hold is that, consistently with procedural due process, California's affirmance of petitioner's conviction upon a seriously disputed
record, whose accuracy petitioner has had no voice in determining,
cannot be allowed to stand. Without blinking to the fact that the history of this case presents a sorry chapter in the annals of delays in the
administration of criminal justice, we cannot allow that circumstance
to deter us from withholding relief so clearly called for .... This
Court may not disregard the Constitution because an appeal in this
case, as in others, has been made on the eve of execution.
Id. at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
95 People v. Chessman, 341 P.2d 679, 699-700 (Cal.
1959).

Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Chessman did not heckle his keepers much longer; on May 2, 1960,
California executed him.9"
Since Chessman, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has changed
remarkably. Notably, the Court has imposed substantive and procedural limitations on the applicability of the death penalty. Before
Lackey, two other prominent death row inmates - Charles Townsend"6 and Willie Lee Richmond97 - asked courts to address the issue of delay while awaiting execution.
Since Justice Stevens's memorandum in Lackey, several other
inmates have unsuccessfully argued that due to the delay in carrying
95 See KUNSTLER, supra note 90, at
286-88.
96

In 1971, Townsend argued that a 15-year, nine-month delay on death row was

unconstitutional. See United States ex reL Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158,
160 (E.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 854 (1972). The district court did not directly rule on the issue, but noted that
the delay was "due principally to the skillful, persistent and conscientious efforts on
petitioner's behalf by his own counsel to save him from the death penalty and secure his release from confinement." Id. at 174. The court also stated that it was
bound by stare decisis to declare that execution by electrocution was not cruel and
unusual punishment. See id.
Prior to his then-record stay on death row, Townsend had achieved notoriety
in 1963. The United States Supreme Court used his case to declare the rules requiring a federal habeas court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
97 In 1973, Richmond was tried for a murder committed earlier
that year. See
State v. Richmond, 666 P.2d 57, 60 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983). He was
sentenced to death. See id. Five years later, a federal district court granted his writ
of habeas corpus, based on the state's use of a constitutionally invalid sentencing
scheme. See id. After a new sentencing proceeding, Richmond was again sentenced
to death. See id.
In 1986, Richmond asserted that the state's 12-year delay in executing him
and the conditions of his confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights. See
Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 802-03 (D. Ariz. 1986), aff'd, 921 F.2d 933
(9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992), vacated, 986 F.2d 1583
(9th Cir. 1993). The federal courts rejected his claim. See id. at 803. The district
court judge noted that Richmond had made good use of his time on death row in no longer exposing himself to drugs and undergoing a religious conversion and that the delay was initiated by him to challenge his conviction and sentence.
See id. In affirming that ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals added that a
capital defendant should not be penalized for his legitimate exercise of his right to
appeal, but that the delay caused by such appeals should not itself ripen into a substantive claim. See Richmond v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 933, 950 (9th Cir. 1994). Eight
years later, the Arizona Supreme Court modified Richmond's death sentence to life
imprisonment without parole. See State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Ariz.
1994). The court proffered three reasons for the decision: Richmond's rehabilitation on death row, the possibility of additional years of delay in the event that a new
death sentence was imposed, and certain changes in the capital sentencing laws. See
id. at 1334. The court noted its "expectation and strong recommendation that he
remain incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and never receive parole."
Id. at 1338.
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out their sentences, it is cruel and unusual punishment for the state
to execute them. Duncan Peder McKenzie, Jr. and William Lloyd
Turner were two such defendants. Their cases are worthy of consideration not only because of their lengthy stays on death row McKenzie, twenty years; Turner, fifteen years - but also because
their long-term residency was prompted by legal rulings in their favor as the cases made their way through the capital litigation process.
C. Duncan PederMcKenzie, Jr.
Soon after the denial of certiorari in Lackey, McKenzie asserted a
claim of unconstitutional delay, based on the twenty years between
the imposition of his death sentence in 1975 and his pending stateordered execution. In his underlying case, on direct appeal, McKenzie raised, as one of numerous issues, the claim that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to him the burden of proving his
state of mind. The United States Supreme Court twice granted
McKenzie's petitions for certiorari and each time remanded the case
to the Montana Supreme Court for further consideration.98 In 1980,
the Montana Supreme Court ruled that any error regarding the jury
instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
McKenzie was unsuccessful in each of the three subsequent federal habeas petitions he filed.'03 The third petition was filed on the
98

See McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 905 (1977); McKenzie v. Montana, 443

U.S. 903 (1979). The United States Supreme Court granted McKenzie's first petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of the then-recently decided Pattersonv. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (finding that due process is not violated by requiring defendant to
prove an affirmative defense). See McKenzie, 433 U.S. at 905. When the United
States Supreme Court granted McKenzie's second petition for certiorari, it vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Sandstrom
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (finding that due process is violated when the jury
is instructed that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" because it relieves the prosecution of proving the defendant's intent and the defendant is forced to rebut the presumption), a case decided in the period between his first and second certiorari petitions. See McKenzie,
443 U.S. at 903.
99 See State v. McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 459 (Mont.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1050
(1980).
1oo See McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1118 (1995). While litigating his first federal habeas corpus petition, McKenzie discovered that in February 1975, a week after the jury verdict and a month before his sentencing hearing, the trial prosecutor had a 45-minute ex parte meeting
with the trialjudge. See id. at 1471. This meeting, McKenzie later alleged, violated
his rights under Gardnerv.Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that due process is
violated when a death sentence is imposed on the basis of information that the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain). See McKenzie, 27 F.3d at 1417. He
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eve of his execution and included his Lackey-type claim. On appeal
from the district court's denial of the petition, McKenzie tried to
persuade the Ninth Circuit to hold the state responsible for the almost fifteen-year period in which no court proceeding resolved a
claim raised in his second habeas petition. Montana countered that
it should be considered responsible only for the five years and nine
months - of his twenty-year delay - that the case had spent on direct

appeal. McKenzie sought a stay of his execution so the courts could
resolve the merits of his claim. He further claimed that several international law decisions added support to his argument.' A majority of the appellate panel ruled that the petition was abusive. Accordingly, the court required McKenzie to show that the court's
failure to consider the merits of his claim would be a miscarriage of
justice. After giving "preliminary consideration" to the merits of the
claim, the appellate court concluded that the views of the international courts would not prevail in the United States. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the procedural safeguards provided by Montana
law were not designed to prolong the period of incarceration, but
were established to eliminate arbitrariness and errors in carrying out
the death penalty, which could be fostered by immediate executions.
The court denied McKenzie's requests for a stay of execution or for
summary issuance of the writ. 10 2 On May 10, 1995, he was executed.'03
subsequently filed a second federal habeas corpus petition, asserting the Gardner
claim. See id. After holding a hearing on the claim, in 1992, the federal district
court ruled that there was no credible proof that the 1975 conference could have
influenced the sentencing decision, and the Ninth Circuit later affirmed that judgment. See id.

101According to the Ninth Circuit, McKenzie relied on Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney
Generalfor Jamaica,4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (en banc) (finding that a delay of 14
years violated section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution); Catholic Comm'nforJustice
and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General S.C. 73/93(Zimb. June 24, 1993, unre-

ported) (finding that delays of two, three, and five years under harsh conditions of
confinement violated the Zimbabwe Constitution); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (finding that delay in administering the death penalty in
Virginia constitutes degrading punishment, in violation of Article 3 of the Conven-

tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, precluding
extradition to Virginia); and Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica,3 All E.R. 469, 478

(P.C. 1983) (Lord Scarman, dissenting, joined by Lord Brightman). See McKenzie
v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
102 See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470; id. at 1493 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(adopting panel
decision), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104 (1995). In dissent,Judge Norris noted that the
20 years that McKenzie had spent on death row, and the conditions under which he

had been confined, were unprecedented and that arguably Montana had satisfied
its interest in exacting retribution. See id. at 1486 (Norris, J., dissenting). Judge
Norris reasoned that McKenzie's claim had further support from recent decisions of
the international courts that did not allow executions after a long delay. See id. at
1487 (Norris, J., dissenting).

These court decisions, in the dissent's view, repre-
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D. William Lloyd Turner
In 1986, six years after he had received a death sentence, William Turner's conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court used the capital case to apply standards developed
in non-capital cases to inquire into the racial prejudice of prospective jurors.'
The Supreme Court remanded the case for further
proceedings because Turner's right to select an impartial jury had
been violated. After a new sentencing hearing before a different
jury, Turner received another death sentence. 1° He then began another round of unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings in state and
federal court.' 6 Days before his scheduled execution, in April 1995,
Turner filed his fourth federal habeas petition, relying on Justice
Stevens's memorandum in Lackey. Turner alleged that after 15 years
on death row, while confined under allegedly torturous conditions,
he could not be constitutionally executed.'0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did
not consider the merits of Turner's claim because the issue was procedurally barred. The court ruled that even before Justice Stevens's
sented "a growing recognition of the need to redress institutional failures that have
resulted in an added dimension of punishment in capital cases that was unknown in
historic times." See id. Judge Norris posited that the issue in the case was not simply
the delay in carrying out the execution, but that it was also the execution following
that delay when the defendant had been placed in restrictive confinement. See id. at
1488 (Norris, J., dissenting). Judge Norris also faulted the majority for not analyzing whether there was a sufficient penological justification for executing McKenzie
after 20 years and for relying on judicial experience - as opposed to facts established in the litigation - to suggest that ruling in McKenzie's favor would halt
nearly all executions in the United States. See id. at 1489 (Norris, J., dissenting).
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit later adopted the panel opinion and vacated
McKenzie's stay of execution. See id. at 1494.
103
See Bob Arnez, Montana Executes Killer While He Listens to Music, PHOENIX
GAZETrE, May 10, 1995, at A5. Jose Ceja, who was executed January 21, 1998 after a
23-year stay on death row, had the longest time lapse between his conviction and
execution for any modem capital defendant. See Barry Graham, Curtainsfor Ceja,
PHOENIX NEWTIMES, Feb. 5-11, 1998, at 15, 17.
See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). The trial judge refused the defense's request, stating that it "had been ruled on by the Supreme Court," which
may have been a reference to Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). In Ristaino, the
Court held that the trial judge was not required to inquire into racial bias of the venirepersons in an intraracial non-capital prosecution. See id. at 597. The Supreme
Court ruled that Ristaino did not control, partly because Turner was being prosecuted for a capital offense. See Turner 476 U.S. at 33.
105 SeeTurner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483 (Va.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988).
106
See Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (recounting litigation history and affirming denial of federal habeas petition), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017
(1995).
107
SteTurner v.Jabe, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1136 (1995).
104
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memorandum in Lackey, Turner had a legal basis for challenging his
execution based on the time that he had spent on death row.'0 8 The
court also ruled that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would not
result from a failure to review the merits of the petition.] 9 Turner
was executed on May 26, 1995."0
IV. RESOLVING THE INORDINATE DELAY CLAIM ACCORDING TO
EIGHTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
Several state capital defendants, in addition to the defendants
in Chessman, Lackey, McKenzie, and Turner, have argued in federal
courts that the convicting state forfeited the right to carry out their
executions."' These capital defendants claimed that the delay be108 See id. at 926. The court noted that Chessman had raised the issue in 1960,

that the California Supreme Court had used the question of delay as one basis for
concluding that capital punishment violated the state constitution in 1972, see People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), that William
Andrews, see Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984) (finding
that repeated setting and staying of execution dates over a 10-year period while the
prisoner litigated issues was not cruel and unusual punishment because it kept the
post-conviction process "moving forward" and preserved the prisoner's due process
rights), affd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919 (1988), and
Willie Lee Richmond had raised similar claims in the 1980s. See Turner, 58 F.3d at
929. Consequently, Turner had the factual and legal tools to construct his claim in
1991 when he filed his third federal habeas petition, having spent 12 years on death
row. See id. Having concluded that Turner failed to show "cause" to excuse his
abuse of the writ, the Fourth Circuit did not consider whether Turner could show
that he had suffered "prejudice" from that "cause." See id. at 931.
109 See id. at 932. Turner conceded that his death sentence
was constitutionally
permissible when he received it, but claimed that under Sauyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333 (1992), he was "ineligible" to be executed. See Turner, 58 F.3d at 932. In Sawyer, the Court ruled that a habeas petitioner who established that he was innocent
would satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice standard, allowing a habeas
court to consider otherwise procedurally defaulted claims. See id. A convicted capital defendant is innocent of death if he can show by clear and convincing evidence
that there was a constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, and
that but for that error he would not have received a death sentence. See id. The
Fourth Circuit declined Turner's invitation to extend Sawyer to cover his case. See
id.

10 SeeJune Arney & Laura Lafay, Turner Executed After 15 Years, VIRGINIAN-PILOT

(Norfolk), May 26, 1995, at Al.
I See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir.) (rejecting a claim based on
a 15-year delay because of a lack of precedent in the prisoner's favor and under the
abuse of writ doctrine), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d
633 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim based on a 17-year delay between trial and the
proposed execution date under the abuse of writ doctrine); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d
1362 (7th Cir.) (rejecting a claim based on a 12-year delay from the conclusion of
direct appeal), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483,
1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a 17-year delay under the abuse of writ doctrine
and finding insufficient facts to warrant a hearing); United States ex reL DelVecchio
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tween the commission of the crime and the fulfillment of the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. They maintained that, due
to the delay, they were no longer eligible for execution. These
claims were unsuccessful. In fact, in none of the cases has a majority
of a reviewing court adjudicated the merits of the inordinate delay
claim.1 2 Further, no court majority in the United States has directly
addressed the issue, or outlined what factors it might consider in resolving an inordinate delay claim." ' This section addresses the inorv. Illinois Dep't. of Corrections, 1995 WL 688675 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (relying
on Free to reject a claim based on a 16-year delay).
State courts presented with the issue have summarily ruled against the defendant. See, e.g., Stafford v. State, 899 P.2d 657, 660 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1173 (1995); State v. McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 293 (Mont. 1995); Porter v.
State, 653 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1092 (1995).
12 This apparent lack of conflict among the courts
of appeal may be one reason
why the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. See generally Todd J. Tiberi,
Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorariin Conflicts Cases: Percolationor Procrasti-

nation, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 861 (1993); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound:
The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PrT=. L. REv. 693
(1995); Michael F. Sturley, Observationson the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdictionin

Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1251 (1989). The Court is not precluded
from granting review of a certiorari petition, notwithstanding the lack of an intercircuit conflict. See Sup. CT. R. 10.1 (providing certiorari may be granted when a
federal court of appeals "has decided an important question of federal law which
has not been, but should be settled by" the Court).
11 Several federal habeas courts presented with inordinate delay claims have
concluded that not reaching the merits of the capital defendant's claim would not
be a miscarriage ofjustice under the pre-Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act federal habeas law. See, e.g., Stafford, 59 F.3d at 1028-29; Turner, 58 F.3d at 931;
Fearance,56 F.3d at 637; McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995); Porter,
49 F.3d at 1485. This is incorrect. The miscarriage ofjustice standard is a narrow
exception that should be used rarely. Before a court could properly conclude that a
miscarriage of justice would not occur, it should "preliminarily" consider the sentencer's rationale for imposing the death sentence. One might discern this rationale by the aggravating circumstances that the sentencer relied on when imposing
sentence and the rationale proffered by the prosecution at the sentencing proceeding. This consideration might uncover that the penological basis for the death sentence either was never adequately established or no longer exists; thus, permitting
an execution in that circumstance would be a miscarriage ofjustice. Moreover, any
sentence - particularly when based on general deterrence or other utilitarian concerns - is a prediction of the future. Therefore, in capital cases courts should be
particularly solicitous of claims of sentencing error.
Other federal courts presented with inordinate delay claims have generally
held that under federal habeas law the .petitioner was precluded from raising the
issue. The courts have essentially found the claim procedurally barred or "without
merit." Arguably, this conclusion is incorrect. The restrictions placed on habeas
corpus - the non-retroactivity rule of Teague, the successive petition and the abuse
of the writ doctrines, the 'cause" and "prejudice" standard, and the miscarriage of
justice exception - give vitality to the state's interest in the finality of its criminal
convictions. See Teague v. Lane, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). The courts are essentially
ordering rules that require a federal habeas petitioner to comply with the state law
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dinate delay claim using the factors contained in the United States
Supreme Court's cases.
To prevent his pending execution, a capital defendant has to
prove that carrying out the execution after an inordinate delay between the sentence and the execution is cruel and unusual punishment. The standards promulgated in Greggand Coker, and applied in
subsequent cases, govern. If the punishment makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,
it is excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional. 114 Punishment that is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime is similarly excessive and unconstitutional."" The capital defendant would have to
argue that, historically, defendants did not remain on death row for
an inordinate period, that court decisions have not routinely permitted long-delayed executions, that the legislatures that have considered the issue have decided against permitting executions after the
defendant has been on death row for an inordinate period, and that
juries have also declined to sentence defendants to death if they
know there will be an inordinate stay on death row. Due to the lack
of legislative guidance on the issue and the fact that juries are not
asked to consider the impact that an inordinate delay will have on
the defendant, courts adjudicating inordinate delay claims should
look for guidance in the rulings of courts that have directly addressed the issue - namely, courts in other countries. All of these
factors suggest that the execution of an inmate who has spent an inordinate period on death row would likely not achieve retribution,
deterrence, or any other utilitarian penal objective. The execution
may inflict unnecessary and wanton pain in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The following subsections consider how these factors
apply to the inordinate delay claim.
A.

History,JudicialPrecedent, and InordinateDelay in Capital Cases

The historical treatment of capital defendants sheds some light
on the kinds of punishments the drafters of the Eighth Amendment
meant to prohibit. It may also answer the question of whether inorprocedural rules in raising and litigating claims that have federal constitutional di-

mensions. The federal courts should not give as much respect to these ordering
doctrines when the underlying issue is whether there has been an inordinate delay
in carrying out the death sentence. If a capital defendant overcomes the habeas
corpus procedural hurdles, he will then have to establish that his inordinate delay
claim is meritorious.
114
See Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173-76 (1976).
11 SeeCokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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dinate delay violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Capital punishment has been an authorized sanction for violations
of the criminal law for centuries. For example, England once had
222 capital offenses.'16 Although there were many capital crimes and
many convictions for capital offenses, after the 1800s there were relatively few executions in England." 7 The period between the imposition of a death sentence and the fulfillment of that sentence generally was not long.
In the mid-1700s, execution of convicted
murderers occurred two days after sentencing, but if the defendant
was sentenced on a Friday, the execution occurred the following
Monday.""
The American colonial laws authorized capital punishment. ' 9
In practice, however, there were few executions in comparison to the
number of capital offenses. Even after the revolution in 1776, the
newly independent states retained most of their capital laws. The
time from the imposition of a death sentence to the execution was
not long. A cursory survey of the capital punishment process suggests that, if an execution occurred, it routinely happened within
one year of the conviction. 20 For instance, one historian reports that
16

SeeJOHN

LAURENCE,

A HISTORY OF CAPIrrAL PUNISHMENT 13 (1960).
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW

17 See LEON RADZINOWICZ,

AND ITS AD-

MINISTRATION FROM 1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM, 1750-1833, 138-64 (1948).
118 See LAURENCE, supra note 116, at 22. An exception existed
for some women.

See id. If a woman sentenced to death informed the clerk of the court that she was
pregnant or if the court suspected that she was pregnant, the court could impanel a
jury of matrons to make that determination. See id.; see alsoJudy M. Comett, Hoodwink 'd by Custom: The Exclusion of Women from Juries in Eighteenth-CenturyEnglish Law
and Literature,4 WM. & MARYJ. OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 1, 17-34 (1997) (discussing

the eligibility to serve on jury of matrons and its role). If the defendant was pregnant, the execution was stayed until she gave birth. See LAURENCE, supra note 116, at
22. After the birth, there was a possibility the state might not execute her. See id,
By 1903, executions did not occur until three weeks had passed. See id. at 24.

"9
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 41-44
(1993); see also Negley K Teeters, Public Executions in Pennsylvania: 1682-1834, re-

printed in 1 CRIME &JUSTICE INAMERICAN HISTORY: THE COLONIES AND EARLY REPUBuC
756 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1991).
12 One reason for the short time span between the imposition
of a death sentence and the execution was the unadorned nature of the criminal litigation process. During the early period of the Republic, criminal cases were generally subject
to some type of review that was within the exclusive prerogative of state authorities.
David Rossman has canvassed the historical data and provided a summary of the review that was available in criminal cases early in this nation's history. See generally
David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal". The History of Review in American Criminal

Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518 (1990). According to Rossman, each of
the newly formed states created courts specifically for criminal matters. Some states
allowed convicted defendants to appeal their cases and receive trials de novo on appeal. See id. at 539-40. Other states allowed the trial judge to refer the case to an
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in Pennsylvania in October 1785, Elizabeth Wilson was convicted of
murdering her "two bastard male children." 2' She obtained a
month's reprieve until January 3, 1786, when she was executed.'2
On August 28, 1778, four Pennsylvanians were convicted of desertion
to the enemy. On September 2, 1778, two were executed and the
other two, who were apparently less blameworthy, received reprieves. 120 Around the same period, another Pennsylvanian, Ralph
Mordern, was convicted on October 30, 1780 and executed less than
a month later, on November 25.124 In December 1787, Massachusetts
authorities executed John Bly and Charles Rose for their roles in
122
Shays's Rebellion,
which had
been squelched that summer. , 1
Washington Goode's capital trial began on New Year's Day, 1849, in
Boston, and lasted four days. 2 7 Goode was found guilty of murder
and sentenced to death. He was hanged as scheduled on May 25,
1849, after the governor rejected his petition for commutation of the
sentence. Even when a legal question arose, through the early 1800s,
the courts resolved most capital cases within six months of the conviction. 2 " Despite the relatively quick judicial process, a pending apappellate court to obtain more authoritative answers to his rulings. See id. at 541-42.
Some defendants used post conviction motions to overturn their convictions. See id.
at 534-37. The executive and legislative branches were other fora for review of
criminal convictions. See id. at 537-39. Usually, capital cases and non-capital cases
were processed differently.
1
SeeTeeters, supranote 119, at 771.
'2
123
1
25

See id. at 771-72.
See id. at 775-76.
See id. at 777.
See Louis L. MASUR, RITES

OF EXECUTION:

TRANSFORMAnON OF AMERICAN CULTURE,

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

1776-1865, at 29 (1989). Shays's Rebellion

was an uprising largely of farmers in Massachusetts in 1786-87. See id. Due to high
taxes, heavy indebtedness and declining farm prices, the farmers faced foreclosure.
See id. They responded by preventing the courts in western Massachusetts from
convening. See id. Unappeased by legislative measures, Daniel Shays led a group
that unsuccessfully attempted to seize a federal arsenal at Springfield. See id. Unlike Bly and Rose, most of the other members of the insurrection received pardons
or commutations of their sentences. See id. See generally DAVID SZATMARY, SHAYS'
REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980).
126 See MASUR, supra note 125, at 29. Jason Parmenter and

Henry McCullough,
who were also participants in that insurrection, received death sentences too, but
received pardons inJune 1787. See id. at 29-33.
12

See id. at 9-24.

For example, in State v. Monaquas, 1 Charlton Rep. 16 (Ga. 1805), ajury convicted two defendants of murdering Georges Martin. See id. at 19. The jury recommended mercy only for the defendant convicted of being a principal in the second
degree; the remaining defendant apparently faced a death sentence. See id. In the
1805 January term, before sentencing, both defendants objected to their joint indictment and trial. See id. The sentencing judge was not prepared to render a decision on one objection because it was an issue of first impression. See id. at 22. Ac128
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peal apparently did not suspend the judgment because capital defendants often had to get a court order to prevent their execution. '
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the time between
the imposition of a death sentence and the execution began to extend into years. In 1960, the State of Washington executed a defendant within thirty-six days of his sentence, while eleven years and ten
months elapsed before California carried out one of its executions.3
The average length of time between sentence and execution in 1960
was about two years.' This period has steadily increased. For example, in 1965 there were seven executions, and reliable figures show
that forty-five months passed between sentencing and execution.
More generally, from 1930 to 1970, the average length of time was
cordingly, the defendants were remanded to state custody. See id. After soliciting
the views ofjudges in other divisions of the court, on May 4, 1805, which was during
the May Term of the court, the court sustained the remaining objection and released the defendants the next day. See id. at 23.
A few years later in North Carolina, a jury convicted Washington, a slave, of
rape, which occurred on February 15, 1811. See State v. Washington, 6 N.C. (2
Mur.) 100 (1812). When asked at the May term of the court whether there were
any reasons why Washington should not receive a death sentence, his attorney argued that the court could only sentence Washington to death during the court term
in which he was convicted. See id. Washington's owner used a writ of certiorari to
remove the proceedings to Superior Court. See id. at 101. In the 1812 January
term, the Superior Court issued an opinion rejecting Washington's contention that
the time to sentence him had passed, and ruled that the May Term of the County
Court could pronounce a death sentence. See id. In a separate opinion that was a
partial dissent, Judge Hall explained the apparent rationale for the majority's decision. See id. at 102 (Hall, J., dissenting). Unlike other courts, the County Court
made a record of all of the proceedings, from which it could be inferred whether
the judge had complied with court rules and did not violate the defendant's rights.
See id. at 102 (Hall,J., dissenting).
129
In New York, for instance, as of 1827, in civil and non-capital criminal cases,
courts could issue writs of error as a matter of right. SeeLavettv. People, 7 Cow. 145
(N.Y. 1827). In capital cases, however, only after providing notice to the attorney
general or prosecutor could a court grant a discretionary writ of error. See Bedinger
v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461, 466-67 (1803). Moreover, the issuance of a
writ of error would not, by itself, prevent the defendant's execution. See id. (stating
that the prosecutor argued that the court should not consider the criminal defendant's appeal because "[ilf capital it would be useless, as the judgment would be
executed before the decision here .... [ilf it was not capital, but imprisonment, the
defendant would have suffered the whole or part of the punishment, before the
judgment here.").
I See UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: PARTrII - DEVELOPMENTS, 1961 to 1965, at 48
170 (1968). The California inmate was Chessman, who was originally sentenced in June 1948 and executed
in May 1960. See KUNSTLER, supranote 90, at 289.
131 See UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 130, at

48

170.
132

See

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

tbl. 6.126, at 769 (1977).

1976,
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about 36.7 months from the imposition of the death sentence until
the defendant was executed."" According to the most reliable figures, which are based on cases processed before the Antiterriorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),'" in 1995 a capital
defendant spent about eleven years on death row before being executed. '"
There may be several reasons for the increase in the time that
an inmate spends on death row. The constitutionalization of criminal procedure 6 and an expansive interpretation of the federal habeas corpus writ' 7 both account for generating some delay. These
developments have allowed capital defendants to raise more legal issues in both state and federal fora. Just as important as the various
legal issues that are cognizable in a capital case are the number of
individuals sentenced to death. From 1930 to 1970 there was a national average of about 600 inmates on death row.'" As of July 1998,
there were 3,474 death row inmates.' 9 If defendants continue to receive death sentences and are placed on death row, and if resolving
each case takes a substantial amount of time, then it is inevitable
that, without significantly increasing the number of judges and other
court personnel who process and decide capital cases,'4' death row
inmates are today -

and in the future -

more likely to spend more

time on death row than they ever have.

Since the AEDPA was en-

133
See U.

S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1973,
tbl. 6.145, at 467 (1973).
1
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at scattered portions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 (1996)).

"3 See U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs BULLETIN:
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1995, tbl. 11, at 11 (1996) (134 months for 1995 executions).
6 See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial to the states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (applying the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to the
states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to the states); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(applying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
137 See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391
(1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
13 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, supra note 133, tbl. 6.145, at 467.
139 See DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra
note 77, at 1.
140 The number of federal court judges has increased
dramatically during this
period. In 1930 there were 45 court of appeals judgeships and 146 district court
judgeships, and in 1970 there were 90 court of appeals judgeships and 331 district
courtjudgeships. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 35657 app. B (1985).
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acted, it remains to be seen whether this law will reduce the time that
capital defendants spend on death row. 4 '
The steady increase in time that capital defendants spend on
death row has occurred without the state courts, state legislatures, or
the United States Supreme Court addressing the issue of a defendant's prolonged stay on death row. The most pertinent statements
by the full Court are dicta in a century-old case. In In re Medley,"42 the
Court ruled that certain aspects of confining a capital defendant,
pursuant to a law enacted by the Colorado Legislature after the
commission of the crime, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 4 The
later-enacted statute required the warden to keep the defendant in
solitary confinement and prohibited the warden from informing the
defendant of either the day or the hour of his scheduled execution.
In describing the import of this new law, the Court wrote:
[W]hen a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in
the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of
the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during
that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it... as to the
precise time when his execution shall take place.' 44
It is important to note that Medley did not rule that the delay was
cruel and unusual punishment, but only that this new process by
which the punishment was to be implemented violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause because the prisoner's "immense mental anxiety
145
amount[ed] to a great increase of the offender's punishment."
Evidence suggests that death row inmates today experience the same
mental anguish while awaiting execution.'4
In sum, until the mid-twentieth century, courts in this nation
generally processed capital cases like other criminal cases, and there
141 There are two reason for this. First, the largest amount of
delay occurs when

the case is in state court. Second, the enactment of the new habeas law - the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) - will bring a new round of
litigation on both its applicability and standards. This, too, may delay the number
of executions. Ironically, the AEDPA was designed to reduce the delay between
death sentences and executions by imposing certain procedural rights in the state
post-conviction review process and modifying certain procedural standards under
the federal habeas corpus laws, including the imposition of time limits within which
the federal courts have to decide capital habeas corpus cases. See generally Larry W.
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUrr. L. REv. 381 (1996).
142 134 U.S. 160 (1890).

143 U.S. CoNs-r., art. I, § 9,
cl. 3.
'"
Id. at 172.
145 Id.
146 See supranote 58 (detailing RobertJohnson's
study of the effects of extended
confinement on death row inmates).
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was hardly any delay between the pronouncement of a death sentence and either the execution or granting of relief to the defendant. Consequently, the issue of inordinate delay did not arise.
Since the mid-twentieth century, the time that inmates have spent on
death row has steadily increased. This may be partly attributable to
the increase in the number of legal issues that can be litigated and to
the fact that most of these claims can be litigated in both state and
federal court. The increase in the length of time between imposition of the sentence and an execution is also a function of the larger
number of death row inmates without a corresponding increase in
resources dedicated to processing capital cases. Finally, Medley, the
only full Court opinion that has alluded to the issue, presumed that
the mental anguish an inmate experienced while awaiting execution
was a form of punishment, seemingly of the sort regulated by the
Eighth Amendment.
B.

ContemporaryLegislativeAttitudes on InordinateDelay in Capital
Cases

In ruling on the substantive limits of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has considered the statutory work product of the legislatures. Through this inquiry, the Court seeks to ensure that society,
via its legislative bodies, has decided to execute a certain class of defendants. In enacting death penalty laws, state legislatures do not
consider whether an execution should occur after the prisoner has
spent a substantial amount of time on death row. One reason for
this may be that most states passed the substance of their death penalty laws before most capital inmates spent decades on death row. In
the wake of Furman,states commuted the sentences of inmates then
on death row. 147 It was only after Gregg and the lack of a substantial
increase in the number of executions that legislators should have
foreseen some of the legal implications of confining an inmate to
death row for a substantial period.'"
Legislatures still have not directly addressed the issue of inordinate delay when enacting or amending capital punishment laws, despite the present likelihood that capital defendants will spend a long
147 SeeJohn W. Polous, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the
Substantive
CriminalLaw: The Rise and Fall of Mandatoy CapitalPunishment,28 ARiz. L. REv. 143,
145 (1986).
148 See District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274,
1283 (Mass.
1980) (finding that an extended period on death row is cruel and unusual punishment under the Massachusetts Constitution); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880,
894-98 (Cal. 1972) (finding that an extended period under death sentence is cruel
punishment under the California Constitution).
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time on death row before their execution - if they ever are executed. Legislatures have considered a related issue of the financial
costs associated with capital punishment in deciding whether to
authorize such punishment. The death penalty is more expensive
than other forms of punishment partly because of the various legal
14
1
avenues by which a defendant may challenge the death sentence.
If executions occurred closer to the date of the defendant's conviction, the state would avoid incurring costs associated with some pretrial, trial, and post-conviction processes and in maintaining correctional institutions. Recently, the Kansas,' 5° New York,'" and Wisconsin 152 legislatures, before reinstituting capital punishment, considered the financial costs associated with the penalty and the
likelihood that any death sentence would undergo multiple levels of
judicial scrutiny. In authorizing capital punishment in the face of
reports showing that, on average, each execution would cost millions
of dollars, each legislature implicitly decided that having some executions was worth the financial cost associated with the death penalty. There is no evidence, however, that any of these bodies considered the issue of delay associated with the imposition of the death
penalty or what effect, if any, the passage of time could have on the
validity of a death sentence.
State statutes do not address the issue of inordinate delay, as
apparently state legislatures do not consider the issue. Notwithstanding this dereliction, one may argue that the authorization of capital
punishment, coupled with the absence of a specific state law prohibiting the state from carrying out that punishment, means that the
See Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 45, 47-57 (1989); Ronald
J. Tabak &J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis
of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 59, 135-36 (1989).
150 See KANSAS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, MEMORANDUM:
COST CON149

SIDERATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY, 1994 H.B. 2578 and S.B. 473,
1994 Kan. Leg. Sess. (rev. Feb. 15, 1994); KANSAS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, MEMORANDUM: COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY, H.B. 2062 as

amended by the House Committee on the Wole, 1987 Kan. Leg. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1987); see
also David J. Gottieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money,
Myth and Morality, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 443, 461-63 (1989)

(discussing arguments

raised about cost of capital punishment in 1987 legislative debate on capital punishment).

151 See THE NEW YORK STATE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE (Laws of 1995, chap. 1),
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOCUMENTS (on file at Albany Law School Library, Union University).
152 See WISCONSIN DEP'T. OFJUSTIcE, FISCAL ESTIMATE, LBR 0270/1
SB 1, DEATH

PENALY OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR 1sT-DEGREE INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE OF A CHILD

UNDER 16 (Dec. 20, 1995).
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state legislature has implicitly authorized executions, no matter the
length of time the defendant spends on death row. Though this argument has a seductive appeal, one should not accept it unquestioningly. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, "Justice O'Connor faced a similar
predicament.
There, the Oklahoma legislature had statutorily
authorized the transfer of 15-year-old defendants from juvenile to
adult proceedings. One consequence of such transfers was that juveniles could face the death penalty, as Thompson did. Justice
O'Connor wanted more evidence that the Legislature had foreseen
this possibility and, thus, concurred in the Court's judgment reversing the death sentence.'
Although Thompson discussed the death eligibility of juvenile
capital defendants, it is an appropriate analogy for inordinate delay
claims. As with the question of death eligibility, an execution after
an inordinate delay requires consideration of whether executing the
defendant is legally permissible. In both instances external circumstances - biological age or the delay in going forward with the execution - may preclude the ultimate punishment, even though in
both situations the defendant committed an aggravated homicide. It
therefore seems appropriate to require that state officials clearly indicate their belief that their state has a legitimate interest in going
forward with an execution notwithstanding the passage of time between the crime and the defendant's continuous incarceration since
the imposition of the death sentence.
The legislature ideally should express such sentiment by statute
or, at least, through explicit legislative findings. Such legislative expressions would show that executions after an inordinate delay were
products of deliberate legislative judgment.'5 ' Another way by which
a legislature might indicate its specific consideration of the issue of
inordinate delay in a particular case is either by an appropriation
specifically authorizing the continued prosecution of that case as a
capital case or by a resolution announcing its approval of the prosecution strategy. Considering the more recent increased politicization of capital punishment,'5 requiring legislative expression on the
153 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988); supra note 38 (discussing
the facts of Thompson).
1
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 850-52 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
155 Statutes and legislative findings do not necessarily mean that
a form of punishment is permissible under the Eighth Amendment. However, they should impact a court's determination of whether the punishment comports with contemporary standards of decency.
" See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, judges and the Politics
of
Death: DecidingBetween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.
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continued prosecution of capital cases may invariably result in the
legislature approving of the strategy. Nonetheless, requiring a formal vote on the issue would likely bring the issue of inordinate delay,
capital punishment, and the facts of the particular case into the public discourse. Public officials - especially those outside of the
prosecutor's office, who might have a more disinterested view of the
case - could then assess the commitment of public resources to the
case, including whether continuing to try the crime as a capital case
is the best allocation of the state's resources.
C. Response ofjuries and InordinateDelay in Capital Cases
Another of the Court's indicia of the evolving standards of decency is the response ofjuries in capital cases. As a way of measuring
the public's acceptance of capital punishment, the Court has considered jury verdicts because, in theory, the jury is a microcosm of society. If juries have consistently imposed the death penalty on a particular class of defendants, then, under the Court's analysis, this
sentencing pattern indicates that imposing a death sentence on
those defendants is in accord with human dignity.
When considering inordinate delay and the response of sentencers, the appropriate inquiry is the sentencer's willingness to impose the death penalty on a person who committed a capital crime
years ago and who since that conviction has remained on death row.
Under the present system of capital punishment, sentencers are not
asked whether the state should execute otherwise death-eligible defendants after these inmates have spent, for example, more than
twice the amount of time on death row awaiting their execution than
previously executed inmates. Sentencers also do not consider if
there is a temporal limit for carrying out a death sentence or
whether a capital defendant should remain under a death sentence
if during incarceration the defendant has acted exemplarily, perhaps
by becoming a useful member of the penal institution.1 7 The
L. REv. 759 (1995).
inordinate
157 The

delay

claim

is

an

extension

of

the

concept

of

"deathworthiness." See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:
DifferentiatingBetween Guilt and Punishment in Capital Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21,

26 n.10, 79-85 (1997). Inordinate delay claims, as defined in this Article, can be
raised only after the defendant has spent a substantial period of time on death row.
In this regard, inordinate delay is the doctrine of "deathworthiness" in a time
frame: A defendant must be "deathworthy" when sentenced to death, and that classification must continue to apply until he is executed. The moment he can no
longer be classified as "deathworthy," he should receive a sentence less than death.
See Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1384 (1973) ("Mootness is ... the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
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United States Supreme Court has not squarely faced these questions.' "
One might argue that in deciding whether to impose a death
sentence, some capital sentencers do consider whether executing the
defendant is the appropriate sanction, no matter how long the delay
between the conviction and the execution. For instance, Texas,'"
Virginia, 0 and Oregon' require that the sentencer consider the future dangerousness of the defendant when deciding what sentence
to impose. In these capital cases, the sentencer is often presented
with the testimony of psychiatrists and evidence of the past criminal
acts of the defendant, with a particular focus on the heinous nature
of the capital crime.'62 If the sentencer concludes that the defendant
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).").
15 The most analogous case decided by the full Court is Sumner v. Schulmran, 483
U.S. 66 (1987), in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Nevada statute
that mandated the death penalty for defendants convicted of murder who were already serving a sentence of life imprisonment. Sumner, however, is based more on
the Court's disapproval of mandatory capital punishment and its belief in requiring
individualized sentencing in capital cases, than on the propriety of sentencing capital defendants to death. Consistent with Sumner, sentencers now consider the
criminal record of capital defendants, including previous capital crimes committed.
On fewer occasions sentencers consider imposing a second death sentence on
a defendant who is already under a sentence of death or life imprisonment. Even
in these cases, however, sentencers are instructed to base their verdicts on the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the capital offense.
They may not impose the death sentence solely because the defendant was already
sentenced to death. See Romanov. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (holding that evidence admitted in a capital case against a defendant already under a death sentence
does not violate due process).
One scholar has noted: "Reliable data concerning the frequency of prison
homicides are scarce. Even more difficult to obtain is accurate information about
inmates who have been sentenced to life imprisonment and the frequency with
which they commit homicides while in the service of such sentences." James R.
Acker, Mandatory Capital Punishment for the Life Term Inmate Who Commits Murder:
Judgments of Fact and Value in Law and Social Science, 11 NEw ENG. J. ON CIuM. AND CIV.
CONFINEMENT 267, 276-82 (1985); see also Wendy Phillips Wolfson, The DeterrentEffect
of the Death Penalty upon Prison Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AM ERICA 159 (Hugo

Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
159

See TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (1) (West 1997).

Texas requires

that its sentencer determine whether "there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society." Id.
1 See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).
161 See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(b) (B) (1995).
162 One study has suggested that in Texas sentencers over-predict the future
dangerousness of capital defendants. SeeJames Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can JurorsAccurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAw & Soc'v
REv. 449 (1989). Moreover, the characterization of the capital offense for which the
defendant was convicted, rather than the jury's assessment that the defendant pre-
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does present a future danger, then it may sentence the defendant to
death. Consequently, one might argue that an affirmative answer to
the question of future dangerousness means that irrespective of the
delay that may occur between the imposition of the sentence and the
execution, the sentencer has already decided that the death penalty
is the proper sentence for the defendant. Again, because sentencers
usually do not consider the issue of inordinate delay, the argument is
not necessarily true. The sentencer might have imposed a sentence
less than death if it had been presented with evidence of the possibility that more than twenty years would pass between the pronouncement of the sentence and the execution, and within that period
there was a good chance the defendant would prove he was not a future danger to anyone within the penal institution. In short, as the
capital sentencing scheme is presently constructed, there is no way to
detect how a sentencer would have responded to the argument that
an inordinate delay between the imposition of the death sentence
and the execution should result in a sentence of less than death.
Therefore, in inordinate delay cases, the verdicts of sentencers
should not be considered a reliable indicator of the appropriateness
of carrying out a previously imposed death sentence.
D. Penological Objectives and InordinateDelay in Capital Cases
In detecting the substantive limits of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has also considered whether executing the capital defendant achieves retribution or deterrence, which Gregg asserted as the
Deterrence is achieved
legitimate goals of capital punishment. 6
when the fear of punishment prevents some crime. According to
this theory, a rational person, after considering the likelihood of apprehension, the severity of punishment (including the stigma associated with being branded a criminal), and the swiftness of imposing
the criminal penalty, will choose not to engage in criminal behavior.
These factors, if appropriately calibrated, supposedly persuade calculating persons that the negative consequences of engaging in the illegal activity outweigh its benefits. Commentators usually divide deterrence into two categories: general deterrence and special (or
specific) deterrence. General deterrence is the regulating force that
sented a future danger to society, determines whether the defendant is sentenced to
death. See id.
163

Other than in the 1976 cases, the Court generally has not explored the pe-

nological basis of the Eighth Amendment as it relates to capital punishment.
Commentators have explored the philosophical underpinnings of the Justices' rationales. See Ellis, supra note 41; Romaine L. Gardner, Capital Punishment: The Philosophers and the Court, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1175 (1978).
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the threat of punishment has on all of society. As a theory of punishment, general deterrence is forward-looking because it is based on
the notion that while imposing punishment on an offender deters
that individual, its greater value is in dissuading others from committing future crimes.' 6' As for the deterrent effect of capital punishment, in Gregg the Court has acknowledged that statistical analyses of
the proposition have been "inconclusive.",1- Nonetheless, the Court
deferred to the legislature's determination that the death penalty
was a deterrent.

164

In contrast, special deterrence is the influence that imposing and carrying out

particular punishment has on a particular offender. As a penological theory it employs both backward- and forward-looking conceptions of justice. It is backwardlooking in its focus on the defendant's prior conduct; the defendant's previous
commission of a crime suggests that the mere threat of punishment was not a sufficient inhibition to criminal activity. Based on that assessment of prior behavior, the
forward-looking component of special deterrence subjects the offender to harsher
treatment after the commission of the first crime, which is designed to leave him
less likely to engage in future criminal activity. Special deterrence allows the rational offender to weigh the likelihood of future, harsher punishment against the
satisfaction that he or she may feel by accomplishing his or her criminal objective.
Capital punishment does not specifically deter because the executed person will not
fear future punishment. Cf Robert Bartels, Capital Punishment: The Unexamined Issue of SpecialDeterrence, 68 IowA L. REv. 601 (1983) (whimsical aside suggesting that
executing capital defendants serves specifically to deter future criminal conduct by
those defendants).
Some have suggested that special deterrence is not a proper consideration in
capital punishment because life imprisonment without parole is a suitable alternative sentence to execution. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv.67, 108 n.183 (1992); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role
and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 711, 715-16 (1990-91). Proponents of this view apparently do not distinguish between special deterrence and incapacitation. Incapacitation requires the
imposition of certain societal restraints on the offender, whereas special deterrence
is operational when the offender, after receiving punishment, chooses not to engage in criminal activities. See Pierce & Radelet, supra, at 715-16.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976). Isaac Ehrlich's study set forth
the major argument that capital punishment serves as a general deterrent. See Isaac
Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975). He concluded that for every execution from 1933 to 1969,
seven to eight innocent killings had been prevented, and he has subsequently defended that general conclusion. See Isaac Ehrlich, Of Positive Methodology, Ethics, and
Polemics in Deterrence Research, 22 Bar. J. CalM. P. 124 (1982); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital
Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL.
ECON. 741 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE LJ. 209
(1975).
Most other researchers have been unable to replicate Ehrlich's conclusions
and have criticized his methods and conclusions. For a good summary of those
criticisms, see generally Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v.
Faiths, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 317.
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Capital punishment may serve as a general deterrent to crime if
a potential offender knows that the contemplated offense is a capital
crime and, due to the certainty of execution, is unwilling to engage
in that criminal activity. Several studies have concluded that, as a
practical matter, the present system of capital punishment usually
does not achieve general deterrence because only a small percentage
of the thousands of capital trials result in death sentences, and an
even smaller number of defendants are executed. Further, the delay
between the commission of the offense and the actualization of the
punishment serves to attenuate the connection between the crime
and the punishment. Carrying out executions in relative seclusion
further diminishes the educative impact that executions can have on
potential capital offenders. In light of all of this, it appears that the
Court probably did not mean that general deterrence - as opposed
to some other utilitarian goal - was the true penological aim of
capital punishment. 6
The distinction between general deterrence and some other
utilitarian basis for capital punishment assumes greater importance
when considering whether Eighth Amendment principles can preclude the execution of long-delayed death sentences. On the one
hand, if general utility is the penological basis for the death penalty,
then perhaps after many years on death row, during which the capital defendant has exhibited a change in character, Eighth Amendment principles militate against going forward with the execution.
With a sufficiently dramatic change of character, there is less need
for society to carry out a death sentence due to the metamorphosis
of the defendant. Executing the offender would no longer serve a
greater social utility in preventing future capital crimes than confinement. On the other hand, if general deterrence is the penological basis for capital punishment, then the passage of time and the
defendant's character transformation are less relevant because punishing the defendant serves as an example to others. That is, the
execution might occur so that potential offenders are discouraged
from engaging in similar criminal activities lest the same fate befall
them.

Though the Justices have not been clear on this point, Justice Marshall argued that the death penalty was excessive punishment because there was insufficient empirical evidence that such sentences were a better deterrent than other
forms of punishment, such as life imprisonment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 342-59 (Marshall,J, concurring). In this regard, the Justice seemed to require
that the death penalty serve some societal purpose or utilitarian goal that could not
be accomplished by other forms of punishment.
1
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Significantly, however, the Supreme Court has stated that capital punishment can be based on deterrence. 1 7 Several times individual Justices have questioned the utility of capital punishment. Justice White has argued in dissents that a mandatory death penalty is a
readily effective way of achieving general deterrence.'" In contrast,
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Spaziano v. Florida6 . and in the plurality
opinion in Thompson,170 maintained that deterrence considerations
alone were not sufficient bases for carrying out an execution. Justice
Stevens has insisted that the sentencer must consider whether there
are mitigating circumstances in favor of a sentence less than death,
and the sentencer must find the defendant morally blameworthy before imposing a death sentence.17 1 Justice Stevens seems to require
that death sentences satisfy some measure of both deterrence and
retribution. Further, one reason for Justices Brennan's and Marshall's consistent opposition to capital punishment was their belief
72
that it is no more of a deterrent to crime than is life imprisonment.'
Retribution, the other penological basis on which capital punishment was justified in Gregg, is achieved when offenders receive
punishment in proportion to the harm that they have caused. Adherents to the retributionist theory of punishment contend that society has an interest in ensuring the punishment of offenders. The
objective of retribution is to restore peace of mind to society and to
eliminate private vengeance. The theory holds that imposing punishment on offenders will satiate the appetite for vengeance that victims, their families and friends, and other members of the public
feel because of the crime. An additional rationale proffered to support retribution is that in killing another, the murderer has forfeited
his right to continue living.
167
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86; see also Scott W. Howe, Resolting the Conflict in the
Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323,
329-61 (1992) (suggesting that capital sentencing schemes should have sentencers
focus on the just desert assessment of the defendant).
1S See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 87-88 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 358-59 (1976) (WhiteJ., dissenting).
169
468 U.S. 467, 479-81 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in
part).
170 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,837-38
(1988).
71
See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 479-81.
72
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (BrennanJ., dissenting); id. at 231-41 (Marshall,

J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 314-71 (Marshall,J., concurring). For an extensive consideration of
Justices Brennan's and Marshall's death penalty jurisprudence and the role of vigorous dissents, see MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS
DISSENTS OFJuSTcES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL (1996).
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The death penalty achieves its retributive function by imposing
the ultimate punishment for the ultimate violation of a person.
There are at least two categories of retribution:1 75 (1) lex talionis, or
the principle of equality between the crime and the punishment,
which has commonly been summarized as "an eye for an eye," and
(2) proportional retribution, which requires that the range of punishment be proportional to the severity of the crime. For practical
purposes, there is one key difference between the two categories.
Lex talionis focuses more on the harm to society that the offender has
inflicted, whereas proportional retribution looks at the criminal act
and its accompanying punishment compared with other criminal offenses and their authorized punishment.1 74 That is, in deciding
whether the defendant should be executed, a lex talionis retributionist would focus on the defendant's killing of another human being as
the focal point for gauging punishment; a proportional retributionist would compare the murder committed by the defendant and its
accompanying punishment to other crimes and their punishments
in assessing whether the capital crime merited the death penalty.
Under lex talionis, capital punishment is justified as the most morally
appropriate punishment when a capital offender kills without justification or excuse. A wholesale adoption of lex talionis would require
the execution of most, if not all, murderers - not simply those who
committed aggravated homicides. Further, one could argue under
lex talionis that capital defendants should experience the indignities
and pain that their victims suffered. Even among supporters of capital punishment, there are, however, few who contend that the defendant must suffer as the victim did. "5 More importantly, under the
present law the state cannot torture the defendant because the
method of execution must comport with human dignity. 1 6 In con-

173

One observer has suggested that there are nine philosophical justifications

that are included within the concept of retribution. See generallyJohn Cottingham,
Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979).
174 See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due

Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1168-73 (1980). MargaretJane Radin has
similarly divided retribution into "protective retribution" and "assaultive retribution." See id. Protective retribution is most analogous to proportional retribution,
while assaultive retribution emphasizes the lex talionis aspect of retribution. See id.
175 See WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT (1979); ERNEST VAN
DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 193 (1975);
STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE MORALtsY OF PUNISHING BY DEATH 7475 (1987);Joesph M.P. Weiler, Why Do We Punish? The Casefor RetributiveJustice, 12
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1978).
176
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?,82 IowA L. REV. 319, 402 (1997) (reviewing case law and pro-
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trast, proportional retribution requires punishing the worst crime
with society's worst penalty, although the authorized punishment
need not duplicate the type of injury of the worst crime. 1 7 A proportional retributionist would accept punishment that morally most
closely approximates the type of harm the offender imposed on his
victim. 78 The moral scruples of society limit the range of permissible
punishments. Also, the authorized punishment must dignify and
recompense the victim's injuries. Under proportional retributionism, the punishment must be sufficient not to trivialize the harm
that the offender has caused. Consequently, proportional retribution may be achieved without the execution of all capital offenders;
only those offenders whose cases represented the worst of the worst
homicides would be eligible for execution under this theory.'7 9
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained whether the retributionist rationale for capital punishment rests on lex talionis or proportional retribution. Again, various Justices have, on occasion, asserted different retributive-based notions in support of the death
penalty. Justice Stewart in Furmannoted:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the
seeds of anarchy - of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.' so
posing test for determining constitutionality of execution methods).
177 SeeJeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty:
Answering van
den Haag, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 115, 120 (1985).
178 See id. at 129.
179 This concept has been incorporated into capital jurisprudence. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 188 (noting that there must be a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which Ithe death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not").
There is a further distinction between lex talionis and proportional retribution, on the one hand, and revenge, on the other hand. Revenge should be considered a non-state-sanctioned desire to inflict harm on others for real or imagined
injuries suffered by themselves or a third party. Unlike retribution, neither principles of equality nor principles of proportionality limit the operation of revenge. See
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 249-55 (1992).
Further,
retributive punishment is a legal sanction imposed by a duly authorized entity; a byproduct of the punishment is public censure and reprobation. Morally responsible
parties are the only proper recipients of retribution. In contrast, revenge is not limited only to those who are responsible for the original victim's injury, and is usually
inflicted outside of state-authorized processes. Revenge is not the proper basis for
the death penalty.
'" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (StewartJ, concurring).
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The Justice expressed a similar view in Gregg.'s' Despite the
thirst for vengeance, which is the essence of lex talionis, the Court has
required temperance. A death sentence can be constitutionally imposed only pursuant to a carefully drafted statute ensuring that, during the sentencing phase, sentencers have adequate information and
guidance on the crime and the character of the defendant. 82 For instance, in a separate opinion in Lockett v. Ohio and in the majority
opinion in Enmund, Justice White declared that before imposing a
death sentence, the sentencer had to find that the capital defendant
possessed a purpose to kill.' 8 In the Justice's view, the absence of
such a finding not only made it "more doubtful" that the threat of
capital punishment could have deterred the capital offense, but
death sentences imposed under such circumstances were grossly out
of proportion
to the crime and failed to contribute significandy to
•
184
retribution. Justice White views such sentences as disproportionate
because retribution is dependent on the defendant's intentions, expectations, and actions.'85 Death sentences are appropriate when tailored to the personal responsibility and guilt of the defendant. In
these instances, capital punishment advances retribution by ensuring
that a criminal receives his just deserts.'8
181 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 ("Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may
be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the
onl%adequate response may be the penalty of death.").
18
See Gregg, 438 U.S. at 190-95; seealsoLockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
18s See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 62428 (White,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800-01; Lockett, 438 U.S. at
624-28 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186

See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800.
See id. at 800-01. Another example is Spaziano, in which one of the issues be-

fore the Court was whether a death sentence imposed by ajudge after the jury recommended life imprisonment violated the Eighth Amendment. See Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). Both the majority and the dissenting Justices agreed
that deterrence considerations alone could not justify a death sentence. See id. at
461-62; id. at 478-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
difference between the Justices turned on whether the jury or a judge would best
reflect retributionism. The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, assumed
arguendo that retribution was the primary purpose behind capital punishment, and
that a sentence pronounced by a jury might best express the sentiments of the
community from which the jury was chosen. See id. at 461-62. However, because the
community's expression was not given "free rein" - a capital sentencing statute
must guide the sentencer's discretion and provide meaningful appellate review of
death sentences - the majority concluded that the legislature could, without violating the Constitution, permit ajudge to impose a death sentence when the jury recommended life imprisonment. See id. at 464-65. Justice Stevens, in dissent, stated
that imposing the death sentence should depend on the facts of the case and
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Retribution, standing alone, does not appear to be a sufficient
penological basis for a death sentence. In Georgia v. Godfrey,'87 the
defendant fatally shot his estranged wife and his mother-in-law. A
jury convicted Godfrey of both murders. The jury also found beyond
a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating circumstance
that the killings were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman," and accordingly sentenced him to death.' 9 Previous state
court cases had interpreted this aggravating circumstance as requiring either evidence of torture, an aggravated battery of the victim, or
a defendant who had acted with a depraved mind. Though there
was no such evidence in Godfrey, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. On appeal, the issue before the United States
Supreme Court was whether the Georgia courts had construed the
aggravating circumstance too broadly. The Court reversed the
judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court first
noted that one could characterize nearly all murders as "outrageous
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." According to the federal
court, the Georgia Supreme Court did not construe the statute such
that there was a principled way to distinguish Godfry's case, in which
the death penalty was imposed, from those in which the defendant
did not receive a death sentence./
Godfrey established that one has to be able to explain why a particular defendant received a death sentence, and that multiple capital murders, by themselves, are not a sufficient reason to impose the
death penalty.' 90 Rather, the prosecution has to prove that the defendant "deserved death."' 9' The manner of the killing or the suffering of the victim might provide the requisite support for retribution
and, thus, a death sentence. One can also view Godfrey's requirement
of an adequate explanation for the death sentence as ensuring that
society inflicts capital punishment only when retribution calls for the
death sentence. 9 2 In light of Godfrey, courts adjudicating an inordiwhether such a sentence achieved retribution. See id. at 478-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens reasoned that a representative
cross-section of the community, as reflected in the jury, was a more appropriate
body than an individual judge in deciding whether to sentence a defendant to
death. See id. at 481 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
188 Id. at 426.
1' See id. at 433.
19o See id. at 429.
191 See id.
192 Recent death penalty cases have focused
more on the retributive nature of
capital punishment. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the
Court ruled that the admission of victim impact evidence does not violate the
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nate delay claim ought to take into account in capital cases that the
sentencer is typically invited to focus primarily on retributionism
during the sentencing phase.
Delay between the commission of a capital offense and the execution affects deterrence and the other utilitarian and retributionist
bases of capital punishment. The utility of the execution is affected
because of the attenuated connection between the crime and the
punishment. When the defendant has a personality different from
the one he or she had when committing the crime, going forward
with the execution may not satisfy retribution. It is an unanswered
question whether society still feels sufficient outrage about the crime
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 833. The Court viewed the information on the victim
as informing the sentencer of the specific harm caused by the defendant. See id. at
823. Victim impact evidence was relevant to the sentencer's decision on whether to
impose the death penalty because it related to Payne's moral culpability and
blameworthiness. See id. at 825. Payne reflects this nation's increased interest in a
penal policy focused on retribution. See id. at 820; see also FRANCIs ALLEN, THE
DECLNE OF THE REHABmITATvE IDEAL: PENAL PoLIcv AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
Payne declined to discuss the admissibility of a victim's family members' opinions
about the crime, or their views on the defendant or the appropriate sentence. See
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. The decision, nonetheless, does come close to allowing
the victim's family and friends to influence greatly the sentence imposed. Consequently, after Payne, the distinction between retribution and revenge has become
more blurred. That is, the pain of the victim's family and friends may be the primary basis for the judicially imposed sentence. Under the process approved in
Payne, it is more likely that when the victim's family and friends want a death sentence the sentencer will return with such a verdict. To the extent that Payne suggests the Eighth Amendment embodies solely retributionism, it is in tension with
the established interpretation of that Amendment.
Prior to Payne, some high-profile cases were notable exceptions to the call for
retribution, such as John Lennon's widow Yoko Ono's and Robert Kennedy's family's requests that the persons who murdered their loved ones not receive the death
penalty. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 149, at 129-31. Families and friends of both
the murderer and the murdered suffer through the trial, appeal, and execution
process. See David Margolick, Divided by Shared Grief" Slaying Shatters Two Proud Army

Families, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at A7. There is apparently little research on the
impact that awaiting an execution has on these victims. See Leslie Beollstroff, Execution Delays Hit Victims' Kin, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Mar. 26, 1995, at lB. Victims'
rights groups are divided on whether executing the defendant truly permits healing. See id.; Eric Zorn, Families DiscoverPeace, Healingin ForgivingKillers, CHIC. TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 1996, at IN; see also David Wallechinsky, "He Killed My Child, But I Don't
Want Him to Die, " PARADE,Jan. 18, 1998, at 4 (classifying the view of loved ones of
murder victims who did not want the killers executed as a "minority" view ). This
willingness to allow those particularly affected by the murder possibly to influence
the punishment imposed seems to run counter to established notions of sentencing. That is, historically, when ajury has been used for sentencing, devices such as
removal of prospective jurors for cause and on a peremptory basis have been justified as ensuring that an impartial jury was impaneled. Now, through victim impact
statements, sentencers are made more aware of the sentiments of the victim's family
and friends and are likely influenced by these sentiments.
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after the defendant has spent a considerable period on death row
and in restrictive conditions of confinement. It is important to ask
whether society cares about the issue because the appropriateness of
the death penalty, as measured by the evolving standards of decency,
is premised on both society's general acceptance of capital punishment and its approval of the death sentence in particular cases.' 3 A
lex talionis retributionist would likely maintain that neither the passage of time nor a radical change in the character of the defendant
alleviates society's duty to punish the properly convicted. Immanuel
Kant captured this notion when he argued that before a civil society
9 4
could disband, it had to execute the last murderer in its prisons.
However, a proportional retributionist would not necessarily maintain that execution is proper in inordinate delay cases.195
The modem system of capital punishment is neither singularly
utilitarian nor completely retributionist. It has components of both
theories. Moreover, retribution, deterrence, and other utilitarianbased theories, while characterized in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as one-dimensional constructs, are, in reality, multifaceted.
Several aspects of these theories are given currency under the present capital punishment laws. For instance, the aggravating circumstances doctrine furthers retribution. That is, the aggravating circumstances proffered by the prosecution generally focus the
sentencer on the social harm caused by the defendant in committing
the capital offense, as well as other seemingly socially undesirable aspects of the defendant's life. Similarly, the mitigating circumstances
doctrine addresses special deterrence and other utilitarian theories.
The general understanding is that if there is some reason for the
sentencer to exercise mercy, then execution of that capital defendant is not necessary to deter future offenses committed by that defendant. In proffering mitigating circumstances, the defense seeks
to direct the sentencer's attention to the positive attributes of the defendant and the defendant's background. Executing a capital de-

:9s

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-84 (1976).

94 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSIcAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101

(J. Ladd
trans., 1965).
195 One commentator suggested that a proportional retributionist might likely
reason:
I cannot see how a sentence that would require a murderer to spend
his full natural life in prison, or even the lion's share of his adult life
(say, the thirty years between age twenty and age fifty), can be regarded as anything less than extremely severe and thus no trivialization of the harm he has caused.
Reiman, supra note 177, at 131.
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fendant after a long delay, however, may not be the most utilitarian
use of the sanction; nor may it fully achieve retribution.
E. InternationalLaw and InordinateDelay in Capital Cases
The United States Supreme Court has considered, though on a
somewhat uneven basis, legal developments in other countries in deciding whether executing a particular class of defendants is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. The Court's inquiries have included both a comparative analysis of the law of the death penalty in
other nations and a consideration of developments in international
law. These inquiries determine whether the practice under consideration "subject[ed] the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment"'"
because the Eighth Amendment "draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 97 In Stanford, however, a plurality of the Court suggested that
"American conceptions" of decency were dispositive and that the sentencing practices of other nations were not relevant in deciding
Eighth Amendment questions.' 8 Even before Stanford, the Court's
reliance on international law was uneven. Trop v. Dulles" formally
started the inquiry in determining the evolving standards of decency.
Similar inquiries were made in Enmund and Coker. Though in footnotes, the inquiry was nonetheless part of the Court's decisionmaking calculus in concluding that those classes of defendants were
not death-eligible."' Since Stanford, however, the Court has not discussed international law in capital cases. Ironically, it was a decision
of a foreign court, the judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the
United Kingdom, that seems to have provided recent interest in the
inordinate delay claim. 0 ' In deciding the question of inordinate deTrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
Id. at 101.
198See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989). The
Court's statement is an apparent reference only to the practices of state and federal governments in the United States and not to all the nations in the Western Hemisphere, as
the Court subsequendy considered practices only in the United States.
1" 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
"0 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
201
See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum
respecting denial of certiorari) (citing Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 4 All
E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (en banc), which held that a 14-year delay between death sentence and proposed execution date violated Jamaican Constitution). There have
been efforts to overturn Pratt. See Don Bohning, Convicts Face Faster Trip to the Gallows: CarribeanIrked at Legal Delays, MLAMr HERALD, Sept. 8, 1998, at Al; Shelley Em196

197
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lay, the Court should consider developments beyond this nation's
borders.
International law and customary international law202 are against
the imposition of the death penalty and the execution of defendants.0 5 The modern trend against the imposition of the death penalty received substantial endorsement in 1948 when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declarationof Human Rights (Declaration),
which in Article 3 recognized a "right to life."
Article 5 of the Declaration prohibits the use of "torture ...or cruel, inhuman or de-

grading treatment or punishment." 25 Though it did not explicitly
prohibit capital punishment, the Declarationformally recognized that
the community of nations sought to impose some limits on a state's
relations with individuals. Subsequent treatises have amplified this
idea. Part III, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was written in 1957 and adopted by the United
Nations in 1976, excludes those under 18 and pregnant women from
being executed. °6 It also limits the use of the death penalty to "the
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the offense."2 7 This Article anticipated the eventual abolition of capital punishment. Three more recent international agreements outlaw capital punishment, but substantially fewer
countries are parties to these agreements than to the Universal Declaration. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, states that a state may provide for the death penalty for acts
ling, Crime Epidemic Revives Hangings in Carribean,THE ATLANTA CONSTITUION, Sept.
20, 1998, at 14A.

Another development recognized in international law that is related to the issue of inordinate delay is the "death row phenomenon."

See Soering v. United

Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (denying 'extradition of German national
to face murder charges in Virginia because it could give rise to violation of Article
III of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because of the anticipated six- to eight-year delay on death row).
M
Customary international law is created when a state adopts a general
and consistent practice, which is followed under a sense of legal obligation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFThE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) &
com. b. (1987). The practice must reflect wide acceptance among the state particularly involved in the relevant activity. See id.
20
See generally WILLIAM A. ScHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993).
204 G.A.
205 Id.

Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948).

See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 33.
207 Id.
206
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committed in wartime or under an imminent threat of war.208 It also
declares that the "death penalty shall be abolished" and that "[n]o
one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed."2 The Second
OptionalProtocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
provides: "No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed."2 0 In addition, Article I of the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, which entered into force on August 28, 1991, declares that
"It]he State Parties to this Protocol shall not apply the death penalty
in their territory to any person subject to their jurisdiction." 11 While
it may be premature to state that the "international norms on the
death penalty show an inexorable progress towards abolition,"2 2
these international agreements do indicate that capital punishment
is a disfavored sanction in the international community.
Both foreign courts and courts established under international
agreements have issued decisions declaring that an inmate on death
row for a substantial period cannot be executed. The first was the
In Soering v. United
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Kingdom, 4 the ECHR ruled that the United Kingdom would violate
Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms2 1 5 if it extradited a fugitive to Virginia to face capital
murder charges. The ECHR relied on evidence that Virginian capital defendants typically spend between six and eight years on death
row before they are executed. 6 While on death row, capital inmates
are kept under strict conditions of confinement and experience
"extreme stress, psychological deterioration and risk of homosexual
abuse and physical attack." 217' The Court characterized this mental

208

Apr. 28, 1983, 22 I.L.M 538 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1985).

209See id. at Art. 2.
210

211
2

G.A.Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 98 (1990).
29 I.L.M. 1447, 1448 (1990).
SCHABAS, supranote 203, at 18.

213 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms established this court. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO

INTERNATIONAL LAW
2

257-65 (2d ed. 1993).

Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or de-

214 11

grading treatment or punishment." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED

103 (10th ed. 1975). Twenty-one nations, which form the Council of Europe,
are parties to the Convention. See id. at 102.
2V See Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep.
at 475.
TEXTS

217

Id. at 460.
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stress and accompanying anxiety as "the death row phenomenon."21 8
The Court concluded:
Having regard to the very long period of time spent on death row
in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting
anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty, and to the
personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age and
mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant's extradition
to the United States would expose him to a real risk of treatment
going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. 219
In June 1993, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe ruled that the
Zimbabwe Constitution prohibited the execution of a prisoner who
had been under a death sentence for six years and three others who
had been under a death sentence for three years.220
The present position of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council of the United Kingdom, as announced in 1993, presumes
unlawful all executions that occur after a five-year delay.22 ' In the case
218

See id. at 469.

219

See id. at 477-78. Soering was extradited to Virginia after the local prosecutor

agreed not to seek a death sentence. He was convicted of two counts of first-degree
murder and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment. SeeJudge OrdersLife Terms
for Soering,VIRGINIA-PILOT LEDGrR-STAR, Sept. 5, 1990, at A6.
22 See Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney Genera4 S.C.
73/93 (Zimb.June 24, 1993, unreported) reprinted in 14 HUM. Ris. L.J. 323 (1993).
At issue was section 15(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution, which reads: "No person
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment." Id. at 325. The Court prohibited the executions. See id. at 337. The
prisoners asserted that their pending executions were constantly on their minds,
that they seriously contemplated suicide, that it was an ordeal to hear an execution
being carried out, and that frequently the prison officials taunted them about their
pending executions. See id. at 324-25. After acknowledging that section 15(1) protected the "dignity of man," the Court then discussed decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United States, that had considered the issue of an execution
following a period of delay. See id. at 326-35. Most of those courts had ruled that
despite the mental anxiety suffered by capital defendants during longer periods of
delay, the execution could occur. See id.Despite this contraryjudicial authority, the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court vacated the death sentences and substituted sentences of
life imprisonment. See id. at 337.
221 The Privy Council has considered the issue three times in the last two decades. The first occasion was Abbott v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, 1
W.L.R. 1342 (P.C. 1979). In Abbott, the Council ruled that a nearly four-year delay
- of which the defendant was responsible for eight months between the defendant's dismissal of his appeal and the issuance of a death warrant did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights under the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution because he had been accorded due process of law. See id. at 1345. The Council's next
published decision on the issue of delay in capital cases was Riley v. Attorney General
ofJamaica, 3 All E.R. 469 (P.C. 1982). There, the Council considered the appeals of
five defendants, who had been under a sentence of death for five to seven years. It
held that "whatever the reason for, or the length of, delay in executing a sentence
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in which it announced its decision, Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica,2 2 which was an appeal by two capital defendants who had
been confined to death row for fourteen years, it stated:
There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of
[executing] a man after he has been held under sentence of
death for many years. What gives rise to this instinctive revulsion?
The answer can only be our humanity: we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a long
2
extended period of time. "
Pratt is a crystallization of the views of the members of the Privy
Council. In addition to relying on the death row phenomenon, the
decision observes that executions in Jamaica have historically occurred within months of the imposition of the death sentence and
notes the Council's "instinctive revulsion" to the length of the delay.
This "revulsion" hardly seems to be an objective standard that can be
measured, and for that reason should not be incorporated into defining the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Further, Pratt is of limited significance to nations such as the United
States, where executions typically take years to occur, due partly to
the several layers of post-conviction review that have tended to extend the length of time that an inmate spends on death row. In this
country, the legal inquiry focuses on objective factors in determining
whether the challenged punishment is cruel and unusual.
Courts in India have considered the question of delay in capital
cases, "such delay being a notorious feature of the Indian legal system." 2 4 In Vathesswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu2 5 the Indian court
ruled that a delay of eight years between the imposition of the sentence and the proposed execution violated the Constitution of India.
The court set aside the death sentences and imposed life imprisonment. Similarly, in Triveniben v. State of Gujarar 6 the Supreme Court
of India held that the period to consider in calculating inordinate
delay was after the judicial process had come to an end, although no
fixed length of time would establish when the delay was a per se violation of the Indian Constitution. In another case, the court commuted the death sentence of a defendant and sentenced him to life
of death lawfully imposed, the delay can afford no ground for holding the execution to be a contravention" of the law. Id. at 473.
M 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (en banc).
223 Id.
at 783.
24
See Catholic Comm'n, S.C. 73/93 (Zimb. June 24, 1993, unreported) reprinted in
14 HUM. Rrs. L.J., supra note 120, at 328.
22
(India 1983) 2 S.C.R. 348.
22'

(India 1989)1 S.C.J. 383, 410.
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imprisonment when his petition for mercy had been pending before
the president for more than eight years.2
A unanimity of opinion, however, does not exist among all foreign courts that have considered the question of delay in capital
cases. In Kindler v. Canada (Minister ofJustice),228 for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that extraditing a convicted capital fugitive to the United States, where the defendant would possibly be
subject to the death row phenomenon, did not violate Canadian law.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee agreed that the extradition did not violate international law.m
Each of these judicial bodies - the ECHR, the Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe, the Privy Council, courts in India, the Canadian Supreme Court, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee considered the mental anxiety that capital defendants face while
awaiting execution. Indeed, each judicial body considered the death
row phenomenon in deciding whether execution after experiencing
that strain for the period in question accorded with its notion of
permissible punishment. These decisions acknowledged that the
death sentence was lawfully imposed, but nonetheless prohibited the
pending execution because of the additional suffering encountered
by the defendant while awaiting execution. In summary, these cases
suggest that international standards are evolving toward requiring
that there be some limit on the time that an inmate can spend awaiting his execution.
When adjudicating inordinate delay claims, court decisions in
this nation should consider the contemporary trend of international
opinion, as the United States Supreme Court has done in previous
cases, when deciding capital cases. ' " International law and the law of
other nations have become interconnected.
If actors and legal institutions in the United States continue to disregard the views of
otherjurists in the international community, analysis of this nation's
laws under the Eighth Amendment will become increasingly dis-

28

See Mehta v. Union of India, (India 1989) 3 S.C.R. 774, 777.
(Can. 1991) 2 S.C.R. 779. At issue was whether the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms, which is part of the constitution of Canada and which em-

bodies many of the rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Riots, would be violated by permitting the extradition to the United States.
See Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991, reported at 14 Hum. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993).
55 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958).

231
See Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internationally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 699, 711-12

(1996).
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jointed from the views of the world and will not reflect the full views
of a "maturing society," as announced in Trop. Moreover, the state
and federal courts are the institutions best positioned to adjudicate
claims based on international law brought on behalf of otherwise
powerless individuals. 2
F.

InordinateDelay as Violative of the Eighth Amendment

Under the test established by the Court for measuring the evolving standards of decency, inordinate delay between the imposition of
a sentence and the actual execution of a capital defendant may violate the Eighth Amendment. The factors that the Court considers
either suggest that such delays are impermissible or do not provide a
determinate answer to the question. Never in this nation's history
have death row inmates routinely spent as long under a death sentence. The most relevant Court precedent suggests that the period
spent awaiting execution is itself a form of punishment regulated by
the Eighth Amendment. There is no statutory authority that specifically authorizes executions after a capital defendant has spent an inordinate time on death row. In addition, sentencers, when deciding
on what punishment to impose, do not formally consider the likelihood that the prisoner will be on death row for an inordinate period. Penologically, an execution after an inordinate delay might
achieve retribution; but the Court has disapproved of naked retribution as the sole rationale for executions. Due to the paucity of definite answers to some of the factors that the Court considers, legal
developments in other nations and in international law ought to be
considered on this issue. International opinion generally tolerates
executions so long as they occur before too long a delay between the
imposition of the death sentence and the execution.

232

See Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal 100

YALz L.J. 2277, 2307-09 (1991).

The law established by international tribunals and

the laws of other nations contain determinate and determinable principles. Others
have discussed how customary international law and treaties can be used to inform

and complement the laws of this nation. See Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of InternationalNorms Restricting the Application of the Death

Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (1983); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary
InternationalNorms of the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
LAW 165 (1995); see also Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform
Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 2 (1983); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv.
367 (1985). One commentator has compared the scope of the Eighth Amendment

with various international treaties and has found the Eighth Amendment generally
wanting. See David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis
of the Eighth Amendment Under InternationalLaw, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 481 (1996).
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In light of the above, keeping an inmate on death row for an
inordinate period violates the Eighth Amendment. Then the question arises: How long a delay is inordinate? The Eighth Amendment
is to be interpreted according to the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."233 Since "the concept
of cruel and unusual punishments is an evolving one[,] the minimum standard of decency in prisons is a function of the conditions
of life on the outside, and, therefore, as society becomes wealthier,
more comfortable, more sensitive, more civilized, the constitutional
minimum of decency in incarceration rises."2" Considering the
enormity of the issue and the procedural and substantive requirements that exist in death penalty cases, capital defendants can hardly
argue with the proposition that to ensure that the conviction and
sentence are proper it can take about seven to eleven years from a
capital conviction to execution." Thus, when an inmate claims that
the state has forfeited the right to execute him because too much
time has passed between his conviction and the proposed execution
date, as he has suffered severe mental strain while awaiting his execution, such claims may not be cognizable until there has been an
inordinate delay between the imposition of the death sentence and
the anticipated execution.
The historical background of the Eighth Amendment and the
words "cruel and unusual punishment" provide slight guidance. In
the seventeenth century, "cruel" was synonymous with severe or excessive. 2" Thus the period of delay must be excessive. The phrase
"cruel and unusual" was used in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, a
predecessor of the Eighth Amendment, as an apparent limitation on
"the imposition of punishments which were unauthorized by statute
and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and.., a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties."""
Long ago, the Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment out233 Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
2m Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.

907 (1989); see also Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
2'5 This approximation was valid for the early 1990s. See sources cited supra
notes 79 & 135. Even when an inmate does not appeal a death sentence or conviction it can take several months before the state carries out the execution. See Killer's
Execution Speediest Since Gary Gilnwre in 1977, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, Md.), Sept.

20, 1996, at 11 (reporting a ten-month delay between the sentence and execution of
an inmate who waived all appeals).
2S6 See Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
OriginalMeaning,57 CAL. L. REv. 839,860 (1957).
I d.
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lawed punishment that involved "a lingering death." ' Accordingly,
the period must be so excessive that the pending execution, in effect, constitutes punishment unauthorized by statute or the courts
because it is a lingering death. This is consistent with the present interpretation of the phrase as outlawing torturous methods of execution,3 which logically includes the state's conduct in bringing about
the execution.240
Inordinate delay claims should be ripe for review only after the
inmate has been under a sentence of death for twice as long as the
national average of time spent on death row. The other cases of
executed defendants establish the temporal period by which an execution should occur. If the defendant has been on death row for
twice as long as the national average, this is excessive, in the commonly accepted legal usage of the term.
While inordinate delay
need not be strictly defined as twice the national average, this proposed bright line rule represents a choice that provides a ready reference point for capital cases. The Court adopted an analogous approach in Barker v. Wing 242 for determining whether there has been
a violation of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial. To decide the issue, courts are to consider the length
and reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and
the prejudice suffered by the defendant.245 Not all of the Barker factors apply with full force in the context of inordinate delay. It is
nonsensical to require that the capital defendant insist that the state
rush to execute him. If the defendant was sincere in such demands,
he could almost always "volunteer" to be executed. In fact, having a
capital defendant on death row for twice as long as other inmates
who have been executed strongly suggests either that for some period the state did riot vigorously seek to carry out the death sentence
See In reKemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-71 (1976); Louisiana ex reL Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1967); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1889);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879).
240 See Denno, supra,
note 176.
2
See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICT1ONARY 561 (6th ed. 1990) (defining excessive as
"[g]reater than what is usual or proper"); William P. Statsky, WESr's LEGAL
2M8

239

THESAURUS/DcIONARY:

SPEciAL DELUXE EDITION 292 (1986)

(same); see also Stack

v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (holding that bail is excessive and violative of the Eighth
Amendment when set at an amount higher than reasonably calculated to assure the
presence of the accused).
242 407 U.S. 514
(1972)
24s See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)
(ruling that an eight-andone-half year delay between indictment and trial violated the defendant's right to a
speedy trial).
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or that the defendant is not within the "core" class of death eligible
defendants. 2" Today, using the most recent and reliable figures
available, from 1995,24- this limitation period would require an inmate to be incarcerated about twenty-two years before he could claim
that his pending execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of the severe restrictions of confinement and mental
strain suffered while awaiting execution.4 6
On the one hand, this bright line rule would ensure that the
task of determining when the Eighth Amendment has been violated
is based on objective factors. Justice Scalia has argued, in reaction to
the apparent subjective nature of the six-factor inquiry to determine
the death eligibility of defendants, that the Court should not consider whether a punishment contributed to accepted goals of punishment. According to theJustice:
The punishment is either cruel and unusual (i.e., society has set
its face against it) or it is not. If it is not unusual, that is, if an objective examination of laws and jury determinations fails to demonstrate society's disapproval of it, the punishment is not unconstitutional even if out of accord with
27 the theories of penology
favored by the Justices of this Court.
Under Justice Scalia's approach, inordinate delay is both cruel
and unusual punishment. Executions after an inordinate delay are
unusual because most defendants are executed before spending an
inordinate time (i.e., twice as long as usual) on death row. These
executions are also constitutionally cruel because the death row
prisoner
suffers unauthorized mental anguish while awaiting execu• 248
tion. Adopting this proposed rule of inordinate delay will permit a

See Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
1998).
245 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 135.
246 As Justice Stevens suggested in Lackey , and as foreign judicial bodies have
244

similarly reasoned, delay directly attributable to the prisoner's exercise of his right
to review of his sentence and conviction ought to be excluded from the calculation.
247
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and
dissenting in part).
248
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 973-76 (1991) (Scalia, J.). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia suggested that the phrase "cruel and usual" in the Eighth
Amendment should be equated with "cruel and illegal." See id. at 973. According to
the Justice, punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless it is not
authorized by law or it is a mode of punishment that is not regularly or customarily
employed. See id. at 974-76. Under this definition, an inordinate delay violates the
Eighth Amendment because no state has specifically authorized the long delay in
capital cases, nor is it customary for an execution to occur after such a long delay.
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court to declare such unnecessarily long-delayed executions unlawful.
On the other hand, it is quite tempting to follow the Court's
lead when assessing the right to a speedy criminal trial249 or the constitutionality of punitive damages awards under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conclude that the Court
"need not, and indeed ...

cannot, draw a mathematical bright line

between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case."2 ° Such an approach eliminates
the need for anything more than the observation that the defendant
has been treated in a fundamentally unfair manner. The Court has,
however, insisted on more precise guidelines when dealing with capital cases under the Eighth Amendment. Another concern that a
bright line rule may raise is that as a case approaches the limit set by
the rule, there may be a flurry of activity to ensure that the defendant's case is moved along, with an accompanying loss of meaningful
review of the defendant's claims. If a bright line rule initiates processing of the case, this should be viewed as beneficial; that review
should strive to ensure that the defendant's claims are meaningfully
and seriously considered. Objecting to the adoption of a bright line
rule seems to disregard the salutary effects of such a rule.
Recent history demonstrates that imposing some substantive
limits on the law of death encourages a state to fine tune its administration of the death penalty. For instance, consider the states' reaction to Furman's declaration that the death penalty was being administered in an arbitrary manner. Furman forced the states to devise
capital punishment schemes that ensured that the discretion in seeking and imposing the death penalty was "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 25 ' Having a threshold temporal requirement of twice the
national average of death row incarceration to state an inordinate
delay claim would account for prosecutions that were not perfect
and would allow the state the opportunity to correct those proceedings through the regular judicial process.252 Until the lapse of this

249 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 523 ("We find no constitutional basis for holding that

the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or
months.").
2
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
251 Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1976).
2
If the defendant's initial conviction is affirmed, but the case is remanded for
resentencing, then the time that the defendant spent in death row pursuant to the
first conviction may be excluded from a subsequent inordinate delay calculation.
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stay on death row does not state an inordinate
period, an inmate's
3
delay claim.
Unlike others who have considered the question of the long delay between the imposition of a death sentence and the inmate's
execution in the United States, and either have concluded that recognition of the claim would undermine the present safeguards that
are part of the capital litigation process? or that the death penalty is
inherently unconstitutional,255 I propose a rule that attempts to accommodate these concerns. I am under no delusion that my proposal is perfect, in part because, as detailed elsewhere,' notwithstanding a finding that the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights
have been violated, the prosecution is not prevented from seeking to
have a death sentence imposed in a subsequent proceeding.2 7 Yet,
as best as I know, my proposal is the first to fashion a rule that accommodates most interests at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike more recent commentators and courts that have considered the issue of inordinate delay in capital cases, this Article has
taken the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on death
eligibility seriously. Starting with Gregg v. Georgia,258 the Court ruled
that the state can use the death penalty for deterrence and retribution. To that end, the Court established standards on how to detect
which class of defendants is death-eligible. The Court has used essentially those standards in subsequent cases outlining death eligibility.

25 The presumptive period of twice as long as the national average, however,
would likely always include prosecutions sufficiently racked with error that they
were fundamentally flawed and of questionable validity under the Constitution.
2
See, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).
255
See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 5, at 573 ("The inevitable stress of impending
death causes inhuman and degrading punishment. Where cruel and unusual punishment exists in the criminal justice system, the required remedy is abolition of the
particular system until the unconstitutionality is eradicated."); Daniel P. Blank,
Book Note, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the "Death Row Phenomenon," 48 STAN. L. REV. 1625,
1656 (1996) ("As a result of these inevitable fatal errors on the one hand, and the
tortuous death row phenomenon on the other, the only way to administer capital
punishment fairly is not to administer it at all.").
256
See Aarons, supra note 244.
257
Cf Marc M. Arkin, Speedy CriminalAppeals: A Right Without a Remedy, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 437, 486-90 (1990) (noting that defendants who establish an unconstitutional delay in having their direct criminal appeal adjudicated receive the delayed
apreal as the remedy).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Under Gregg's objective criteria for measuring the evolving standards of decency, inordinate delay between the imposition of a sentence and the actual execution of a capital defendant violates the
Eighth Amendment. Historically, death row inmates have not regularly spent as long under a sentence of death as they may now. The
most relevant Court case presumed that the mental strain experienced while awaiting execution, without a realistic notion of when, if
ever, that execution would occur, is a form of punishment. Legislatures have not explicitly considered the issue of inordinate delay;
consequently, there is no statutory authority that specifically authorizes executions after a capital defendant has spent an inordinate
time on death row. Presently, sentencers are not allowed to consider
the likelihood that the prisoner will be on death row for an inordinate period in deciding whether to impose a death sentence. Thus,
the imposition of a death sentence should not be considered a definitive statement on the issue. Finally, the only penological objective that can justify an execution after an inordinate delay is unmitigated retribution. The Court, however, has disapproved of naked
retribution as the sole rationale for a death sentence. Due to the
paucity of definite answers to some of the factors that the Court considers, legal developments in other nations and in international law
ought to be considered on this issue. These developments reflect
the values of other nation states on the death penalty and have traditionally informed the development of this nation's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. International opinion is generally against the
imposition of capital punishment, but is willing to tolerate such sentences so long as they occur before an inordinate delay between the
imposition of the death sentence and the execution.
Inordinate delay claims should be ripe for review only after the
inmate has been under a sentence of death for twice as long as the
national average of time spent on death row by other executed inmates. This standard is based on both the language of the Eighth
Amendment and the historical tradition underlying that Amendment. Even if one adopts the view suggested by some members of
the Court - that inquiring whether a form of punishment contributes to accepted goals of punishment is not a function of the Court
inordinate delay appears to be both cruel and unusual punishment. Executions after an inordinate delay are unusual because
most defendants are executed before spending an inordinate time
(i.e., twice as long as usual) on death row. Such executions are cruel
in the constitutional sense because the condemned experience severe mental anguish while awaiting execution.
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The inordinate delay claims raised by state death row prisoners
could be another reason for those opposed to capital punishment to
advocate its abolition. These claims can also serve as an occasion to
examine the administration of capital punishment in the United
States or in a particularjurisdiction. I have chosen the latter course.
It is an open question whether other actors in the capital litigation
process - namely prosecutors, judges, governors, and others authorized to settle for a sentence other than death - will take the United
States Supreme Court decisions on death eligibility seriously when
presented with the next claim of inordinate delay made by a capital
defendant.

